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Holper: The Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations

THE UNREASONABLE SEIZURES OF SHADOW DEPORTATIONS
Mary Holper*

President Trump, during his campaign, promised a “deportation task
force” to swiftly deport the eleven million undocumented noncitizens in
the United States.1 Within his first week in office, he issued two
Executive Orders calling for stricter immigration enforcement and a
stronger border.2 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
Memos implementing his interior and border enforcement executive
orders indicate that DHS will use every tool to enforce the immigration
laws, expanding the use of procedural tools that bypass immigration
courts and ensuring that noncitizens remain detained3 during these
“shadow”4 deportations. Two of these procedural tools—administrative
removal and expedited removal—allow an Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) officer or Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”)
officer—the immigration police—to sign off on arrest and detention
without involvement of an immigration judge.5 Such a seizure without a
probable cause finding by a neutral, detached magistrate, if occurring
within the criminal justice system, would clearly violate the Fourth
Amendment.6

* Associate Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. I would like to thank Daniel Kanstroom,
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Kari Hong, Robert Bloom, Sharon Beckman, Patricia McCoy,
Mary Bilder, Christopher Robertson, Shu-Yi Oei, Daniel Farbman, and Ray Madoff for their comments,
and Kit Johnson, Jason Cade, Carolina Núñez, Jennifer Koh, and Geoffrey Heeren for their comments to
an earlier draft of this article at the Emerging Immigration Scholars’ Workshop in Dallas. Thanks also
to Mary Kate Sexton for her research assistance, and Dean Vincent Rougeau for his research support.
1. Lauren Fox, Donald Trump Wants to Use a “Deportation Force” to Remove 11 Million
Immigrants
From
the
U.S.,
The
Atlantic
(Nov.
11,
2015,,),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/donald-trump-wants-to-use-a-deportation-force-toremove-11-million-immigrants-from-the-us/445917/.
2. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2018); (Jan.Exec. Order No. 13767, 82
Fed. Reg. 8793) (Jan. 25, 2018).
3. Matthew T. Albence, Implementing the President’s Border Security and Interior
Enforcement Policies, (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3889695doc00801320170630123624.html; John Kelly, Implementing President's Border Security and
Immigration
Enforcement
Improvements
Policies
(Feb.
20,
2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/implementing-presidents-border-security-and-immigrationenforcement-improvement-policies (herein after “Border Security Implementation Memo”); John Kelly,
Enforcement of Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/enforcement-immigration-laws-serve-national-interest
(hereinafter
“Enforcement Memo”).
4. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
181 (2017).
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).
6. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
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In this article, I build off of prior scholarship and litigation examining
Fourth Amendment violations in immigration law7 to argue that the
arrest and detention pursuant to administrative and expedited removal is
an unreasonable seizure. I propose a framework for thinking about the
Fourth Amendment violations at issue in these shadow deportation
procedures. This framework focuses on the reasonableness of the
seizure, not the status of the person harmed by the seizure, and not
whether the proceedings that follow are punishment. In doing so, this
article examines how the Fourth Amendment’s core concerns are
present in the immigration law enforcement context notwithstanding
immigration law’s plenary power. The article contributes to the
scholarship that has both challenged immigration law’s historical
exceptionalism and mapped where the plenary power has not trumped.8
The rise of “removal in the shadows of immigration court,”9 also
dubbed “speed deportations”10 or “diversions from the system,”11 is a
7. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104
GEO. L. J. 125 (2015); American Civil Liberties Union, ICE Detainers and the Fourth Amendment:
What
Do
Recent
Federal
Court
Decisions
Mean?
(Nov.
13,
2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2014_11_13_-_ice_detainers_4th_am_limits.pdf;
Christopher N. Lasch, The Faulty Arguments Behind Immigration Detainers (December 18, 2013),
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, “PERSPECTIVES" SERIES, 2013, U
Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-34, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2432011 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2432011; Christopher N. Lasch, Litigating Immigration Detainer Issues
(2011), Chapter 34 in Colorado Bar Association, IMMIGRATION LAW FOR THE COLORADO
PRACTITIONER (1st ed. November 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2140031; Christopher N. Lasch,
Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 164 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Jennifer Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 129 (2010) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence that has endorsed
exceptionally broad policing authority at the border has transformed the nature of immigration policing
in the interior and that existing law is insufficient to guard against racial profiling and unreasonable
police arrests and detentions of noncitizens); Kevin Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became
the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for
Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L. J. 1005, 1024-25 (2010) (arguing that Supreme Court cases
interpreting the Fourth Amendment in immigration enforcement has authorized racial profiling and that
the Court should revisit the authorization of such profiling and the vast discretion afforded law
enforcement); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51
EMORY L. J. 1003, 1011-1021 (2002) (arguing that, notwithstanding the plenary power, the Supreme
Court always has treated immigration detention like other civil detention, requiring the government to
justify detention because of dangerousness or flight risk); Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere: The
Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 416 (2002) (noting that the
Supreme Court in INS v. St. Cyr is noteworthy in its approach to judicial review because “[n]ot once
does the so-called plenary power raise its hoary head”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
1625, 1627-28 (1992) (arguing that courts have created an important exception to the plenary power
doctrine by hearing constitutional claims sounding in “procedural due process” and that “this
‘exception’ has grown to the point that we need to rethink what the ‘rule’ is”).
9. See Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 4.
10. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2015).
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topic that has begun to receive some scholarly attention. These types of
removals include administrative and expedited removal, but also
reinstatement of removal and stipulated orders of removal. Jill Family
has critiqued such “diversions” from the typical removal procedures
through an administrative law institutional design lens.12 Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia has critiqued such “speed deportations” by focusing
on the enlarged role of prosecutorial discretion when noncitizens face
these procedures.13 Jennifer Lee Koh has identified several concerns
that apply to mainstream immigration court proceedings, and asserts that
those critiques are amplified in such shadow proceedings.14 Amanda
Frost has suggested that some of the errors that occur in immigration
removal happen because low-level officials are asked to administer
complex and ambiguous immigration laws quickly and with little
training or oversight; she has called for more empirical research of
wrongful deportations in the model of the Innocence Project, which has
used data from DNA exonerations to raise public awareness of wrongful
convictions and to advocate for additional procedural protections in the
criminal justice system.15
In this article, I examine two of these procedures, administrative
removal and expedited removal, through the lens of the Fourth
Amendment.16 I focus on the absence of a finding of probable cause by
a neutral detached magistrate in order to detain a person. In the criminal
procedure world, this right stems from Supreme Court cases interpreting
the Fourth Amendment; namely, the 1975 case Gerstein v. Pugh17 and
the 1991 case County of Riverside v. McLaughlin.18 In stark contrast to
the rights guaranteed in the criminal justice context, the statutes and
regulations authorizing administrative and expedited removal
contemplate an ICE or CBP officer making the critical decision to seize
a person and detain him or her for the duration of these procedures
without any review by an immigration judge.19 I focus on the Fourth
Amendment concerns at issue with these types of shadow deportations,
11. See Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009).
12. Id. at 635.
13. See Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 10.
14. See Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 4.
15. See Amanda Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes: Using Immigration Enforcement Errors to
Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 769, 769 (2015).
16. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
17. 420 U.S. at 14.
18. 500 U.S. 44 at 55-56.
19. See infra Parts IIb, c.
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as opposed to the others, which at least have some involvement by an
immigration judge.20
By identifying the arrest and detention that occurs within
administrative and expedited removal as immigration law’s next Fourth
Amendment problem, I build on the work of other immigration law
scholars who have recognized serious Fourth Amendment violations
within immigration procedures. Christopher Lasch has exposed the
Fourth Amendment violations inherent in ICE detainer practices,21
which has led to successful damages claims for Fourth Amendment
violations when state or local officials hold a person, pursuant to an ICE
request, once criminal custody has ended.22 Following the successful
detainer litigation, Michael Kagan described the practice of warrantless
arrests for deportation without a prompt probable cause hearing by a
neutral decisionmaker as “immigration law’s looming Fourth
Amendment problem.”23 As Kagan has identified, in regular removal
proceedings, the lack of a prompt review of custody by a neutral judge
presents a Fourth Amendment violation.24 He proposes that courts read
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to require that
immigration arrests automatically be reviewed by a neutral immigration
judge within a seventy-two hour period, unless the person is released
from custody.25 As opposed to focusing on why substantive Due
Process allows these Fourth Amendment principles to apply when an
immigration officer arrests a noncitizen for removal, as Kagan has

20. With reinstatement of removal, there at least has been some involvement of a judge
somewhere in the process (albeit during a prior removal order). But see Koh, Removal in the Shadows,
supra note 4, at 206 (“The removal order serving as the basis for reinstatement might be the product of a
shadow removal proceeding.”). Stipulated removal orders and in absentia removal orders, although
carrying their own procedural complications, at the very least involve an immigration judge signing off
on the order of removal. See Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 4, at 218; see also generally
Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in
Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475 (2013).
21. See, e.g., Lasch, The Faulty Arguments Behind Immigration Detainers, supra note 7; Lasch,
Litigating Immigration Detainer Issues, supra note 7; Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s
Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, supra note 7.
22. Id.; see also ACLU, ICE Detainers, supra note 7.
23. Kagan, supra note 7. Other scholars have briefly critiqued immigration law’s lack of
prompt, independent review of detention. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under Arrest:
Immigrants’ Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 853, 888-91 (2008) (commenting on the
lack of prompt review of detention as part of a larger set of recommendations to ICE to “inject humanity
into its arrest, detention, and removal procedures”); see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández,
Invisible Spaces and Invisible Lives in Immigration Detention, 57 HOW. L. J. 869, 882 (2014)
(comparing criminal justice and immigration process, where the government can “merely lodge an
accusation that a person has violated the law”).
24. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 167.
25. Id. at 130; see also id. at 166 (describing how many states limit emergency civil commitment
without a hearing or neutral review to 72 hours or less).
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argued,26 I make the case that the Fourth Amendment itself provides
noncitizens the right to have their detention reviewed by a neutral judge
when immigration officers arrest them for removal. Kagan also
discusses why prompt probable cause hearings are necessary in the
context of regular removal proceedings, which at least have some
involvement of an immigration judge, even if not as prompt as in the
criminal justice context.27 In administrative and expedited removal,
however, the statute and regulations contemplate no role by a neutral
judge, except in very limited circumstances.28
The Fourth Amendment is not only applicable when a criminal justice
actor holds a noncitizen for deportation, as was the case in the detainer
litigation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the Fourth
Amendment to immigration officers’ actions enforcing immigration
laws.29 That the Fourth Amendment applies when an ICE officer arrests
a noncitizen for deportation is one of the few positive outcomes of the
1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,30 where the Court refused to
apply the exclusionary rule, except when immigration officers
committed egregious violations of the noncitizen’s Fourth Amendment
rights.31 Because the Lopez-Mendoza decision dealt only with the
remedy of evidentiary exclusion, it implicitly recognized that the Fourth
Amendment applies to such an arrest,32 as subsequent courts have
clarified.33 More recently, in 2012, the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
U.S.,34 reiterated that the Fourth Amendment applies to arrests for
immigration enforcement purposes.35 These cases have left the door
26. See id. at 129 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment and due process overlap because the requirement
of the Fourth Amendment is, in effect, a requirement for a certain kind of process.”).
27. See Kagan, supra note 7.
28. The circumstances in which a judge may review an expedited or administrative removal case
are the “escape valves” for those who fear persecution and, in the context of expedited removal, for
those who claim to be U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, refugees, or asylees. See infra Part IIb,
c.
29. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413
U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
30. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
31. Id. at 1050-51.
32. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 147-48; M. Isabel Medina, Ruminations on the Fourth
Amendment: Case Law, Commentary, and the Word “Citizen,” 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 189, 196
(2008); see also id. (“The Lopez-Mendoza opinion accepted without question the principle that the
Fourth Amendment applied to undocumented persons in a criminal proceeding.”).
33. See, e.g., Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015) (“To hold otherwise
would give no effect to the language used by the Supreme Court in Lopez–Mendoza expressing concern
over fundamentally unfair methods of obtaining evidence and would ignore the fact that eight justices in
Lopez–Mendoza seem to have agreed that the exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings in some
form.”); Oliva-Ramos v. USAG, 694 F.3d 259, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2012); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d
65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).
34. 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
35. The Court considered section 2(B) of the law, which required Arizona officers to make a

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2

928

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

open to the application of a different Fourth Amendment right; namely,
the right to prompt review of detention by an immigration judge for
probable cause, and release should that review not occur.
The remedy proposed by this article would partially dismantle the
shadow deportation regime created through expedited and
administrative removal because it would require the prompt involvement
of a “neutral” immigration judge;36 within 48 hours the judge would
have to find probable cause to detain or the noncitizen should be freed
from detention. Thus, detention decisions occurring within the context
of expedited and administrative removal would start to more closely
resemble regular removal proceedings, in which there is at least some
review by a neutral immigration judge of the decision to detain.37
The need for independent review of the decisions made by ICE and
CBP officers is even more critical in a Trump administration. Former
press secretary Sean Spicer described how the DHS Border Security
Implementation Memo and Enforcement Memo “took the shackles off”
CBP and ICE officers,38 suggesting that these officers are clamoring to
detain and deport more noncitizens.39 The memos recommend that DHS
hire thousands of additional ICE and CBP officers, with little vetting.40
“reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest
on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is
unlawfully present in the United States.” Id. at 411 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11–1051(B)).
The law also provided that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status
determined before the person is released.” Id. While the Court found that other provisions of Arizona’s
law were preempted by federal law, section 2(B) was not, because nothing in federal law prohibited
states from sharing information with ICE. Id. at 410-11. When challengers suggested that Arizona
officials would delay the release of individuals pending information from ICE, the Court stated, citing
Fourth Amendment cases, that such holds would be illegal. Id. at 413-14 (citing Arizona v. Johnson,
555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). The Court also stated, “it is
not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States…[i]f the police stop someone
based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.” Id. at
407.
36. I put “neutral” in quotes because I recognize that immigration judges have been critiqued as
not being truly neutral, since they work as employees for the Department of Justice, and their decisions
can be overruled by the Attorney General. See infra Part IVa.
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing for immigration judge review of ICE’s decision to detain);
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(1)(ii) (immigration judge may review whether someone is properly classified as a
mandatory detainee); In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999) (same). I leave aside any critique of
why a more prompt probable hearing should happen during regular removal proceedings. See Kagan,
supra note 7 (advocating for probable cause hearing by immigration judge within 72 hours of
immigration custody); see also Mary Holper, Promptly Proving the Need to Detain for Post-Entry
Social Control Deportation (forthcoming VAL. U. L. REV. 2017) (arguing that prompt probable cause
hearings should only occur for cases where ICE alleges deportation for post-entry conduct).
38. See Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sean Spicer, The White House Office of Press
Secretary (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/21/press-briefingpress-secretary-sean-spicer-2212017-13.
39. Id.
40. See Kelly, Border Security Implementation Memo, supra note 3; Kelly, Enforcement Memo,
supra note 3.
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History tells us that this can lead to serious abuses, due to the lack of
adequate supervision, which leads officers to abuse their authority with
impunity.41 The Border Security Implementation Memo plans to expand
expedited removal to apply to entrants without inspection who have
been in the U.S. for up to two years,42 which David Martin, former
General Counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
(the precursor to ICE and CBP), warned against in 2000.43 A leaked
ICE memo instructs its officers to “prioritize[e] detention resources on
aliens subject to expedited removal and aliens removable on any
criminal ground” and calls for the expansion of detention space.44
Immigration arrests increased by more than forty percent in the Trump
administration.45 In sum, there has never been more of a need for
oversight of these detention decisions by the judiciary.
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I describe the protections
available in the criminal justice system; namely, the Fourth Amendment
right to have one’s detention expeditiously reviewed by a neutral and
detached adjudicator. In Part II, I first describe the procedures used in
regular removal proceedings and discuss past litigation advocating for
the Fourth Amendment right to a probable cause hearing by a neutral
judge.
I then describe the procedures used in expedited and
administrative removal; noticeably missing from these proceedings is a
neutral and detached judge who signs off on the detention. Part II also
examines some of the legal challenges to these summary removal
procedures, none of which have included considerations of the Fourth
Amendment right to review of detention by a neutral judge. Part II
concludes with a discussion of the ICE detainer litigation and lessons
learned from these cases about Fourth Amendment rights in the
immigration enforcement context. In Part III, I propose a framework for
thinking about the Fourth Amendment violations at issue in
administrative and expedited removal, which should focus on the
reasonableness of the seizure, not the status of the person harmed by the
seizure, and not whether the proceedings that follow are punishment.
41. Josiah Heyman, Why Caution is Needed Before Hiring Additional Border Patrol Agents and
ICE
Officers
(April
24,
2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/why_caution_is_needed_befor
e_hiring_additional_border_patrol_agents_and_ice_officers_final.pdf (“Now the Trump administration
wants to repeat history by hiring thousands of additional [ICE and CBP] officers, without introducing
the reforms and safeguards needed to avoid the abuses and scandals of the past.”).
42. Kelly, Border Security Implementation Memo, supra note 3, at 5-6.
43. David Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J.
INT’L L. 673, 700 (2000). He wrote, “[t]he risks are simply too great that persons who are not EWIs
[entrants without inspection] (or who are longer-resident EWIs) could get caught up in the sweep.” Id.
44. Albence, supra note 3, at 1-2.
45. What Impact Has Donald Trump Had on Illegal Immigration? BBC NEWS (June 24, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44319094.
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By framing the issues this way, one can see that Fourth Amendment
rights should not diminish because it is an immigration officer
conducting the seizure, or because it is a noncitizen (or alleged
noncitizen) whose is unreasonable seized. Because my proposal seeks
prompt immigration judge review of the detention that occurs in
administrative and expedited removal, in Part IV, I discuss policy
concerns with this proposal. I also propose what I believe is the most
appropriate remedy: a habeas corpus petition filed once detention
reaches 48 hours without review by a judge.
I conclude by
recommending that courts recognize administrative and expedited
removal as immigration law’s next Fourth Amendment problem, and
vindicate these rights by ordering that anyone facing expedited and
administrative removal promptly be brought before an immigration
judge for a probable cause hearing to justify detention.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING
In the criminal justice system, a probable cause hearing before a
neutral magistrate within forty-eight hours of arrest is necessary to
ensure that an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated.46
This hearing promotes a central purpose of the Fourth Amendment,
which is to interject a neutral magistrate between a private citizen and
the government that wants to deprive him of his liberty.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause.”47 In 1948, in Johnson v. U.S.,48 the Supreme
Court decided that to implement the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, whenever possible,
the existence of probable cause must be decided by a neutral and
detached magistrate.49 The Court wrote,
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support
of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out

46.
47.
48.
49.

See Riverside, 500 U.S. at 55-56; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114-117.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Id. at 13-14.
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crime.50
In 1975, in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court reversed a Florida
criminal procedure which, according to Florida courts’ interpretation,
foreclosed the suspect’s right to a preliminary hearing on probable cause
when a prosecutor filed an information.51 In describing the state court’s
interpretations of its criminal procedures laws, the Court found troubling
that “[a]s a result, a person charged by information could be detained for
a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor.” 52 The Court
wrote, “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty
following arrest.”53 The detached judgment of a magistrate judge is
necessary to continue detention after initial arrest; the prosecutor’s
finding of probable cause is insufficient to protect the important Fourth
Amendment rights to be free of an unreasonable seizure.54 This Fourth
Amendment rule applies to “any significant pretrial restraint of
liberty.”55
In 1991, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Court defined
“bringing someone promptly before a magistrate” as forty-eight hours.56
The Court wrote that “the Fourth Amendment permits a reasonable
postponement of a probable cause determination while the police cope
with the everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly
burdened criminal justice system. But flexibility has its limits; Gerstein
is not a blank check.”57
Thus, in the criminal justice system, a probable cause hearing before a
magistrate within forty-eight hours of arrest58 is necessary to place a
neutral, detached judge between the government and a person whose
50. Id.
51. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105-06.
52. Id. at 106.
53. Id. at 114.
54. See id. at 114-17.
55. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). The Gerstein Court also allowed few procedural rights in this
probable cause hearing, reasoning that the “sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining
the arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an
adversary hearing.” Id. at 120.
56. Riverside, 500 U.S. at 55-56.
57. Id. at 55. The Court reasoned that even if probable cause hearings are provided within 48
hours, there may still be “unreasonable delays” – for example, “delays for the purpose of gathering
additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or
delay for delay’s sake.” Id. at 56.
58. This probable cause hearing is different from the later arraignment. See Gerstein, 420 U.S.
at 106 (holding that arraignment, which happens often 30 days after arrest, is insufficient to satisfy an
arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights); but see Riverside, 500 U.S. at 58 (reasoning that probable cause
hearing and arraignment could be combined so long as the proceedings occurred within forty-eight
hours).
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liberty is taken by the government.59 To summarize, “[t]he central
issues [in a Gerstein/Riverside probable cause hearing] are neutrality,
time, and automaticity.”60
II. EXPEDITED, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND REGULAR REMOVALS, AND THEIR
FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES (OR LACK THEREOF)
This section explains the scarce procedural rights that are available in
the context of administrative and expedited removals, thus presenting a
contrast from the relatively rigid requirements of a prompt probable
cause hearing by a neutral detached magistrate in the criminal justice
process. Before discussing the administrative and expedited removal
procedures, it is helpful to describe the procedures available in regular
removal proceedings.
A. Regular Removal Proceedings
ICE and CBP have statutory authority to arrest a noncitizen without a
warrant in three situations.61 First, such warrantless arrest may occur if
the noncitizen is entering or attempting to enter the United States
illegally in the officer’s presence.62 ICE or CBP also may conduct a
warrantless arrest if the agent has “reason to believe that the alien so
arrested is in the United States in violation of [the immigration laws]
and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”63 Courts have
held that this “reason to believe” language is the equivalent of probable
cause.64 Finally, ICE or CBP may make arrests for immigration lawrelated felonies or other felonies cognizable under the laws of the U.S. if
there is a likelihood of escape before a warrant can be obtained.65
Following a warrantless arrest, the ICE or CBP officer must bring the
59. Besides the aforementioned Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) also reflects this requirement. FED. R. CRIM. P 5(a)(1)(A) (“A
person making an arrest within the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay
before a magistrate judge, or before a state or local judicial officer as Rule 5(c) provides, unless a statute
provides otherwise.”).
60. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 162.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5.
62. Id.
63. Id. ICE and CBP may, without a warrant, interrogate a noncitizen “believed to be an alien”
about his or her right to remain in the U.S. and board vessels or vehicles near the border for the purpose
of patrolling the border. Id.
64. See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 216 (1st Cir. 2015) (collecting cases); see
also U.S. v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Because the Fourth Amendment applies to
arrests of illegal aliens, the term “reason to believe” in § 1357(a)(2) means constitutionally required
probable cause.”).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a).
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noncitizen “without unnecessary delay” for examination before a
different ICE or CBP officer.66 That officer decides, within forty-eight
hours, whether to issue a Notice to Appear and whether to detain that
person.67 The Notice to Appear is the document that commences
removal proceedings.68 It is issued once an ICE or CBP officer has
confirmed the existence of prima facie evidence for removal.69 The
regulation requires that it be a different ICE or CBP officer (not the
arresting officer) who makes the prima facie evidence determination,
although “[i]f no other qualified officer is readily available and the
taking of the alien before another officer would entail unnecessary
delay, the arresting officer, if the conduct of such examination is part of
the duties assigned to him or her, may examine the alien.”70
Upon issuance of a Notice to Appear, the noncitizen is brought to an
immigration judge, who works for the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, an agency within the Department of Justice.71 This judge
presides over removal proceedings,72 where the judge determines
whether to sustain the charges of removability.73 If the charges are
sustained, then the noncitizen has the right to apply for various forms of
relief from removal, such as asylum, withholding of removal,
adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, or voluntary departure.74
In these regular removal proceedings, the noncitizen has the right to
counsel (at no cost to the government);75 the noncitizen also may inspect
the government’s evidence,76 present evidence or witnesses;77 and
66. Id.
67. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d). Following the September 11, 2011 attacks, the regulation was amended,
without comment, to expand the time frame from 24 hours to 48 hours, but to include a provision
allowing for this timeline to be extended “in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance in which case a determination will be made within an additional reasonable period of
time.”
See 66 Fed. Reg. 48335 (2001); see also Wadhia, Under Arrest, supra note 23, at 874
(critiquing regulation for failing to define “emergency,” “extraordinary circumstance,” or “additional
reasonable period of time”).
68. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a).
69. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a).
70. Id.; see also Jason Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89
TULANE L. REV. 1, 70 (2014) (“[N]o rule or agency practice requires or even regularly facilitates the
review of a [charging document] by any attorney before it is filed with the immigration court.”).
71. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229; see also Executive Office for Immigration Review, About the Office,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last visited May 12, 2017).
72. Prior to 1996, noncitizens who had been admitted to the United States were in “deportation”
proceedings, whereas those who were stopped attempting to enter the United States were in “exclusion”
proceedings. The 1996 reforms to the INA combined these into “removal” proceedings. CHARLES
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.01
(rev. ed. 2010).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
74. See generally id.
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
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appeal any negative decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals78
(also situated within the Executive Office for Immigration Review).79
The noncitizen may appeal certain types of decisions to the circuit court
of appeals.80
While in removal proceedings, the noncitizen’s custody is first
reviewed by an ICE or CBP officer who, by regulation, requires the
noncitizen to prove that he or she is not a danger or flight risk.81 The
noncitizen may appeal this custody determination to an immigration
judge, who also requires the detainee to disprove dangerousness or flight
risk.82 There is a further appeal of custody to the Board of Immigration
Appeals,83 and a district court, in habeas corpus proceedings, may
review the legality of the detention.84
Although some courts have examined the right to have a noncitizen’s
detention for deportation promptly reviewed by a neutral judge, the
Supreme Court has never squarely decided the issue. In 1960, in Abel v.
U.S.,85 the Court considered whether an arrest pursuant to an
administrative warrant by immigration authorities, which did not require
judicial involvement, should lead to suppression of the evidence under
the Fourth Amendment.86 Declining to suppress the evidence, the Court
stated, “[s]tatutes authorizing administrative arrest to achieve detention
pending deportation proceedings have the sanction of time”87 (although
77. Id.
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5).
79. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1).
80. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
81. See 8 C.F.R. 236.1(c)(8). In a separate article, I have critiqued the reasoning behind this
regulation, as it violates the presumption of freedom. See Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in
Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 75, 90-91 (2016).
82. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b); 236.1(d)(1); Matter of Hussam Fatahi, 26 I. & N. Dec. 791, 79495 (BIA 2016); Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 81 (critiquing the Board’s burden allocation in
bond proceedings). Not all detainees in removal proceedings have a right to an immigration judge’s
review of custody. For example, if the detainee is described as an “arriving alien,” a judge may not
review his custody. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). Also, for those who are properly included in a
mandatory detention category (due to deportability for certain crimes), there is no immigration judge
review of his custody. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); In Re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999) (judge
may review whether a detainee is properly included in mandatory detention category). The Supreme
Court upheld the mandatory detention statute against a Due Process challenge in 2003. See Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524-25 (2003).
83. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f), 1003.38.
84. Federal district courts have jurisdiction to address “questions of law in habeas corpus
proceedings brought by aliens challenging Executive interpretations of the immigration laws.” I.N.S. v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306–07 (2001); see 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The habeas court does not have
jurisdiction, however, over discretionary decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
85. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
86. Id. at 230. The Court was writing prior to its express holdings that the Fourth Amendment
applied when immigration officers arrested noncitizens for deportation. See infra notes 180-190.
87. Id.
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it does not appear that anyone had ever raised that challenge to arrest for
deportation).88 The Court’s statement about administrative arrests was
dicta, however, since the Court repeatedly stated that the petitioner had
waived the issue by not raising it in prior stages of the litigation.89
The question of whether noncitizen juveniles who were in INS
custody had the right to a prompt probable cause hearing before a
neutral judge was an issue in litigation that began in the Ninth Circuit in
the 1980s. In Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese,90 a panel of the
Ninth Circuit reversed a district court judge’s order granting such
hearings.91 The panel concluded that Gerstein did not apply to
deportation proceedings, and that the Gerstein Court itself stressed that
its holding was not readily transferrable to civil proceedings.92 The
panel also followed the dicta in Abel, writing that although “professing
not to reach the issue of whether an INS arrest warrant was invalid
because it failed to comply with the fourth amendment's requirements
for warrants, the Court nonetheless devoted five pages to rejecting
petitioner’s claim.”93 An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit disagreed,
finding that the children’s fundamental liberty interest required that “the
decision to detain be made only in conjunction with a neutral and
detached determination of necessity.”94
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in 1993, in the case
entitled Reno v. Flores.95 The Court found that there was no
88. See id. at 233 (“The constitutional validity of this long-standing administrative arrest
procedure in deportation cases has never been directly challenged in reported litigation.”); id. (“This
Court seems never expressly to have directed its attention to the particular question of the constitutional
validity of administrative deportation warrants. It has frequently, however, upheld administrative
deportation proceedings shown by the Court’s opinion to have been begun by arrests pursuant to such
warrants.”).
89. See id. at 230 (“The claim that the administrative warrant by which petitioner was arrested
was invalid, because it did not satisfy the requirements for ‘warrants’ under the Fourth Amendment, is
not entitled to our consideration in the circumstances before us. It was not made below; indeed, it was
expressly disavowed.”); id. (stating that the petition “did not challenge the exercise of [the warrant]
authority below, but expressly acknowledged its validity”); id. at 231 (“At no time did petitioner
question the legality of the administrative arrest procedure either as unauthorized or as unconstitutional.
Such challenges were, to repeat, disclaimed.”); id. at 232 (“Affirmative acceptance of what is now
sought to be questioned could not be plainer.”). As dicta, these statements would not bind future courts
deciding the issue. See Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (“Questions which merely lurk in the
record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having
been so decided as to constitute precedents.”).
90. 913 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1990).
91. Id. at 1335-37.
92. Id. at 1336 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27). The Court remanded to the district court
to determine whether such a hearing was appropriate under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. See
id. at 1337 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35).
93. Id. at 1337 (citing Abel, 362 U.S. at 233).
94. Flores, 942 F.2d 1352 at 1364-65.
95. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
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fundamental liberty interest at stake, since the case dealt with INS
custody of children, who are “always in some form of custody.”96 Thus,
“shackles, chains, or barred cells” were not at issue, as would be the
case in adult immigration detention.97 The Court dedicated very little of
its decision to the procedural due process claim that the children should
have their detention promptly reviewed for probable cause by a neutral
judge. Rather, the Court found that the juveniles were given ample
procedures under the regulations.98 Nowhere in the majority opinion is
Gerstein even mentioned.99 Because the Flores Court took great pains to
ensure that it was not deciding about “shackles, chains, or barred cells,”
the issue of whether adults in immigration detention can seek a
Gerstein-style hearing was not resolved.100 Also, because the Court was
ruling on a facial challenge to the regulation, it did not have to consider
what would amount to “excessive delay” in holding a hearing.101
Other courts have not recognized a Fourth Amendment right to a
neutral detached magistrate to review detention for probable cause in the
immigration context.102 Some have followed the dicta in Abel.103
96. Id. at 301-02.
97. Id. at 302.
98. Id. at 307-08.
99. This is unlike the panel decision and the en banc decisions, which, between the majority
opinions and the concurring and dissenting opinions, yielded much discussion about the applicability of
Gerstein or whether a prompt probable cause hearing should be afforded to the juveniles under the
Mathews v. Eldridge test. See, e.g., Flores, 913 F.2d at 1335-37 (panel opinion discussion of
applicability of Gerstein); id. at 1348-49 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [Gerstein] Court reasoned that
when ‘the stakes are this high,’ a determination by a neutral magistrate is required. Prosecutorial
judgment standing alone is not enough.”); see also Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364-65 (en banc opinion
addressing Gerstein issue); id. at 1367-69 (Tang. J., concurring) (discussing that under Mathews, not
Gerstein, plaintiffs should have probable cause hearing with neutral judge and stating, “[o]ur
Constitution has long recognized that combining the roles of prosecutor and adjudicator in a single
entity is a recipe for fundamentally unfair and erroneous decision making.”); see also id. at 1374-75
(Rymer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that Gerstein does not apply to civil
deportation hearings, but that “[t]ime limits and impartiality . . . are basic safeguards against arbitrary
action”).
100. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 151-52.
101. See id. In Flores, the INS regulation challenged had been in effect only one week when the
district court issued its judgment; prior to that, the INS had relied on a 1984 policy that was codified in
the regulation. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 295-97, 300. The Court reasoned that to prevail in such a facial
challenge, the children “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation]
would be valid.” Id. at 301 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
102. See, e.g., Salgado v. Scannel, 561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding warrantless arrest
legal pursuant to statute and thus subsequent statement taken following arrest should not be suppressed);
cf. U.S. v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 399-400 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 5(a), which requires a prompt probable cause hearing, does not protect detainees arrested for
deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)).
103. See, e.g., Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535, 540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“While the
Supreme Court declined to pass upon a similar argument in Abel, . . . some pertinent observations there
were nonetheless made . . . the court did refer to its frequent upholding of administrative deportation
proceedings shown to have commenced by arrests made pursuant to such warrants.”).
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Others have assumed, without much analysis, that an immigration
officer’s review of the charges is the equivalent to prompt review of
detention by a magistrate judge.104 Of interest is Judge Posner’s opinion
in the 1982 case Arias v. Rogers.105 Considering a challenge to the INS’
arrest without warrant procedures, Judge Posner observed that the INA
requires “that an alien arrested without a warrant ‘be taken without
unnecessary delay before an officer of the Service having authority to
examine aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United
States.’”106 He wrote that “the reference is to a special inquiry officer,
also called an immigration judge. Special inquiry officers have judicial
authority . . . and therefore correspond to the committing magistrate in a
criminal proceeding.”107
Judge Posner was mistaken about the
involvement of the immigration judge in such arrest authorization, as the
Ninth Circuit later pointed out.108 The charging document was in fact
written by the then-INS (now ICE), not the immigration judge. The
confusion is understandable, given the history of today’s immigration
judges, who were once officers of the INS.109 However, it demonstrates
how at least one circuit court believed that more process actually existed
within regular removal procedures, and thus was unable to see a Fourth
Amendment violation.

104. See, e.g., Tejeda-Mata v. Immig & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980)
(“The phrase ‘has reason to believe’ has been equated with the constitutional requirement of probable
cause.”); Min-Shey Hung v. U.S., 617 F.2d 201, 202 (10th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, Cantu v. U.S. 423 U.S. 1035; Au Yi Lau v. U.S. Immig and Naturalization
Service, 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
105. 676 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982).
106. Id. at 1142 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)).
107. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a)).
108. In the panel opinion in Flores, the Ninth Circuit cited Arias as erroneously concluding that
examining officer mentioned in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) was an immigration judge rather than INS
official, and analogizing immigration judge to “committing magistrate in criminal proceeding.” Flores
by Galvez-Maldonado, 913 F.2d at 1337 (citing Arias, 676 F.2d at 1142).
109. Judge Posner wrote Arias one year before the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) was created. With EOIR’s creation, the former INS and immigration judges were finally
divorced in 1983, although both agencies remained within the Department of Justice. Sidney B. Rawitz,
From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERP. REL. 453-59 (1988), reprinted in Stephen E.
Legomsky and Cristina M. Rodríguez, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, Sixth Ed. 686
(2015) (chronicling the history of the separation of functions between the INS and what ultimately
became immigration judges under the newly-created EOIR in 1983). While “special inquiry officers”
were, in 1982, the precursor to what today is an immigration judge, at the time, they were part of the
INS. There were procedures in place to ensure that special inquiry officers were separate from
prosecuting officers. Id. at 690. With the changes that created EOIR, immigration judges were never
given the authority to review INS’ charging documents for probable cause. Today, EOIR remains
within the Department of Justice, whereas ICE, CBP, and the Citizenship and Immigration Services are
within the Department of Homeland Security. See Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).
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B. Expedited Removal
Expedited removal is the removal, without a hearing, of those who are
caught without a proper visa or legal status.110 Noncitizens subject to
expedited removal are detained during the process and generally do not
see an impartial judge; an ICE or CBP officer signs off on their
detention and deportation, with only a supervisor’s review.111 The only
way for a noncitizen to see a judge is if he expresses a fear of return112
or swears to be a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, refugee, or
asylee.113 However, the noncitizen remains detained during this
process.114 Expedited removal was created in 1996 to address what was
perceived as an abuse of the asylum system, wherein noncitizens could
arrive from another country, claim asylum, and spend years in the U.S.
while this claim made its way through the clogged immigration
courts.115
When Congress wrote the expedited removal statute, it authorized the
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).
111. Id.
112. Should a noncitizen express a fear of return, the case is referred to an asylum office for a
credible fear interview; should the noncitizen satisfy an officer of his or her fear of return, the case will
be referred to an immigration judge for an asylum hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §
235.1(b)(4).
113. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(i). If the DHS officer confirms that the
noncitizen was admitted as a lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee, the DHS officer shall not
issue an expedited removal order against the noncitizen. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(i-iv). In the case of
a verified U.S. citizen, the DHS officer may not place the person in removal proceedings. Id.
114. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(i) (stating that a DHS officer must issue an expedited
removal order against a claimed U.S. citizen, LPR, refugee, or asylee for whom DHS cannot verify that
status and “[t]he person shall be detained pending review of the expedited removal order [by the
immigration judge]”); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (“Pending the credible fear
determination by an asylum officer and any review of that determination by an immigration judge, the
alien shall be detained.”). Although parole is an option, that parole is highly discretionary and
unreviewable by any neutral judge. See id. (“Parole of such alien in accordance with section
[1182](d)(5) of the Act may be permitted only when the Attorney General determines, in the exercise of
discretion, that parole is required to meet a medical emergency or is necessary for a legitimate law
enforcement objective.”). Once the noncitizen has passed a credible fear interview, if he or she is not an
“arriving alien,” an immigration judge may review custody in a bond hearing. See In re X.K., 23 I. & N.
Dec. 731 (BIA 2005) (a noncitizen in expedited removal but who is not an “arriving alien” may request
a bond hearing once she passes her credible fear interview); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (defining “arriving
alien” as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-ofentry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in
international or United States waters and brought into the United States by any means” and clarifying
that “[a]n arriving alien remains an arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to section [1182](d)(5) of the
Act, and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked”).
115. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104–208, Div. C. § 321, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996); Department of Justice, Inspection and
Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings;
Asylum Procedures; Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg.10313 (March 6, 1997); American Civil Liberties Union,
American Exile: Rapid Deportations That Bypass the Courtroom 4 (2014), available at:
https://www.aclu.org/report/american-exile-rapid-deportations-bypass-courtroom.
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INS to apply the summary procedures to any noncitizen who has been in
the U.S. for fewer than two years.116 The INS, however, initially only
applied expedited removal to those who were stopped at the border
seeking admission to the U.S..117 The immigration authorities then
incrementally expanded its application.118 In 2002, expedited removal
grew to apply to those who had arrived by sea and had been in the U.S.
for fewer than two years.119 Expedited removal again grew in 2004 to
apply to noncitizens who had been in the U.S. fewer than fourteen days
and were found within 100 miles of a land border.120 In the February
2017 Border Security Implementation Memo, former DHS Secretary
Kelly directed the agency to engage in new rulemaking on the issue of
expedited removal, indicating the agency’s intent for expedited removal
to expand to those who cannot prove they have been in the U.S.
continuously for more than two years.121
Court cases challenging expedited removal have largely failed, due to
statutory limitations on the right to judicial review in such
proceedings,122 in addition to the lack of Due Process protections
available to the persons to whom it has traditionally applied, those who
are stopped at the border and thus seeking entry.123 Because of the
“entry fiction,”124 courts have found that these individuals have no right
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).
117. Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 4, at 116.
118. Ayelet Shachar describes how expedited removal has allowed the border to become
“detached from its traditional location at the perimeter of the country’s edges [by] relying on the legal
fiction of removing unwanted migrants ‘at the border’ when they are already firmly within its
perimeter.” Ayelet Schachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
CIV. LIBERTIES 165, 174 (2007).
119. Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b)(I)(a)(iii) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924 (Nov. 13, 2002).
120. Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11 , 2004).
121. Kelly, Border Security Implementation Memo, supra note 3, at 5-6.
122. See infra Part IVb; see also Li v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion
vacated on reh'g as moot, 324 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (“With respect to review of expedited removal
orders,…the statute could not be much clearer in its intent to restrict habeas review.”).
123. See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 59 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)) (“Because such aliens are not considered to be within the
United States, but rather at the border, courts have long recognized that such aliens have ‘no
constitutional right[s]’ with respect to their applications for admission.”); Li, 259 F.3d at 1136 (finding
that noncitizen seeking entry and subjected to expedited removal procedures may not raise Due Process
arguments because she has no constitutional right to Due Process to challenge her immigration status or
petition for entry into the U.S.). There is a pending petition for rehearing en banc in the case of U.S. v.
Peralta, 847 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2017), in which the Ninth Circuit held that a noncitizen who was
arrested not long after surreptitiously who was placed in expedited removal after entering the U.S. had
no Due Process right to counsel. Id. at 1136.
124. See Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1953) (permitting the
indefinite detention of a noncitizen who was assimilated to the status of one seeking admission to the
U.S., which meant that he had no constitutional rights to assert); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
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to judicial review of their cases.125
C. Administrative Removal
Administrative removal is the deportation, without a hearing, of
certain noncitizens whom the government accuses of having been
convicted of an “aggravated felony.”126 Created in 1996, administrative
removal is another summary removal procedures that, especially for the
scapegoated “aggravated felons,”127 became a way to cut off access to
immigration courts.128
The noncitizen is necessarily subject to
mandatory detention throughout this procedure.129 The regulation also
states that there is no administrative review of detention for a noncitizen
in administrative removal proceedings.130
The noncitizen never sees a neutral judge during his detention for
administrative removal, even though there exist immigration judges who
work for the Executive Office for Immigration Review.131 Rather, it is
denied entry is concerned.”); see also infra note 303 (discussing critiques of entry fiction).
125. See, e.g., Castro v. US DHS, 835 F.3d 422, 445-46 (3d Cir. 2016).
126. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1. Administrative removal was first introduced in
1996 with IIRIRA. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C. § 321, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
127. Initially introduced in the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the aggravated felony definition
included murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking (or attempts or conspiracies to commit those
crimes). See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). Amendments
since 1988 have added “crimes of violence,” theft, receipt of stolen property, fraud, forgery, and
obstruction of justice, to name a few offenses that now meet the twenty-one part definition. See e.g.,
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4(b)(5), 117 Stat.
2875, 2879 (2003) (adding peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons); IIRIRA
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C. § 321, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–627 (1996) (adding sexual
abuse of a minor and rape); AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277–78 (1996)
(adding bribery, forgery, counterfeiting, certain gambling offenses, vehicle trafficking, obstruction of
justice, perjury, and bribery of a witness); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4321–22 (1994) (adding theft, receipt of stolen
property, burglary, trafficking in fraudulent documents, RICO, certain prostitution offenses, fraud or
deceit, tax evasion, and human smuggling); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(a)(3),
104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990) (adding “crimes of violence”). With IIRIRA in 1996, Congress also
reduced the length of sentence necessary to trigger the aggravated felony definition from five years to
one year, IIRIRA, § 321(a)(3)–(4), 110 Stat. at 3009–627, while at the same time redefining a sentence
to include any suspended sentence. Id. at § 322(a)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 3009–628.
128. The charge, an aggravated felony, also carries a consequence of forever preventing the
noncitizen from returning to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). If the noncitizen does
reenter, he or she can be prosecuted for federal reentry and faces up to a 20-year sentence if the
underlying removal was for an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).
129. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (proscribing mandatory detention for a noncitizen who is
deportable for an aggravated felony, among other criminal grounds of deportability).
130. C.F.R. § 238.1(g) (“The decision of the Service concerning custody or bond shall not be
administratively appealable during proceedings initiated under section 238 of the Act and this part.”).
131. The only review of the charges happens by an ICE supervisor, unless the noncitizen contests
the charges within fourteen days). See 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(a), (d), (f). The noncitizen also may file a
petition for review within 30 days of when an administrative removal order becomes final. 8 U.S.C. §

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/2

18

Holper: The Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations

2018]

UNREASONABLE SEIZURES OF SHADOW DEPORTATIONS

941

an ICE officer who writes the charging document, finds that detention is
justifiable based on that charge, and issues an order of deportation.132
The statute and regulations only require that the ICE officer be different
than the officer who initially placed the noncitizen in the administrative
removal proceedings.133 If ICE finds that the case is not amenable to
administrative removal, the officer may refer the case to an immigration
judge; no provision requires such referral.134 In the February 2017
Enforcement Memo, former DHS Secretary Kelly referred to
administrative removal as “effective tool to facilitate the removal of
criminal aliens from the United States” and stated that it “shall be used
in all eligible cases.”135
In court cases examining administrative removal, there has been no
real focus on the lack of a neutral, detached magistrate. Several of the
cases involved questions about whether the noncitizen had adequately
exhausted the legal issues raised, if he or she never challenged the
“Notice of Intent to Issue Final Administrative Order” (the document
that ICE uses to notify the noncitizen of administrative removal
proceedings).136
In at least one case, the noncitizen argued,
unsuccessfully, that the statute requires all removal proceedings to occur
before an immigration judge.137
1228(b)(4)(E). Courts have held, however, that if the noncitizen did not respond to the charges within
the requisite time period, he has not exhausted administrative remedies and therefore may not seek such
judicial review. See, e.g., Malu v. USAG, 764 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014); Escoto-Castillo v.
Napolitano, 659 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011); Fonseca-Sanchez v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 439, 443-44 (7th
Cir. 2007); but see Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135, 141-42 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding jurisdiction to
review administrative removal order because there is no notice to noncitizens that they must raise all
legal issues in response to the Notice of Intent to Issue Administrative Removal order, since the form
only allows noncitizens to contest issues of fact).
132. See 8 C.F.R. § 238.1
133. See 8 U.S.C. 1228(b)(4)(F); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(a).
134. See 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)(ii)(A) (an officer may place the noncitizen in regular removal
proceedings); id. at (d)(2)(iii) (“If the deciding Service officer finds that the alien is not amenable to
removal under section 238 of the Act, the deciding Service officer shall terminate the expedited
proceedings under section 238 of the Act and shall, where appropriate, [place noncitizen in regular
removal proceedings].”); id. at (d)(3) (“Only the deciding Service officer may terminate proceedings
under section 238 of the Act, in accordance with this section.”).
135. Kelly, Enforcement Memo, supra note 3, at 3.
136. See, e.g., Malu, 764 F.3d at 1289 (finding that noncitizen could have, but failed to, exhaust
argument that she was not an aggravated felony because she did not respond to the Notice of Intent and
that because of the conceded aggravated felony, court lacks jurisdiction to review errors of fact that she
alleges); Aguilar-Aguilar v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that noncitizen’s
failure to challenge Notice of Intent “sound[ed] the death knell of his [petition for review] of the [Final
Administrative Removal Order] because only a lack of that enumerated proof limited DHS’ discretion to
remove Petitioner pursuant to 1228(b); but see Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2008)
(court could consider whether DHS correctly classified noncitizen’s conviction as an aggravated
felony).
137. Osuna-Gutierrez v. Johnson, 838 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Nothing in § 1228
requires that an IJ preside over the expedited removal process—in fact, the words ‘immigration judge’
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Only in one case, Etienne v. Lynch,138 did the Fourth Circuit in 2015
examine the administrative removal procedures in any great depth.139 In
a few places within the decision, the court appears troubled by the fact
that an ICE officer is unilaterally making these critical decisions.140 For
example, when comparing the administrative removal procedures to
those that occur in typical removal proceedings, the court wrote: “for
aliens like Etienne who have not been lawfully admitted to the United
States for permanent residence, the INA authorizes an expedited
removal process, without a hearing before an IJ. Instead, a DHS officer,
who need not be an attorney, presides over this expedited removal
process.”141 In Etienne, the court held that DHS had properly classified
his conviction as an aggravated felony and therefore denied his petition
for review.142
It does not appear that any judge has seriously considered a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the statute and regulations authorizing
administrative removal. This is unsurprising, as the INA does not
provide for court-appointed counsel in standard removal proceedings,143
much less administrative removal proceedings.144 Even in a jurisdiction
like New York that has a fund to provide public defenders for indigent
noncitizens in detention, counsel is provided only for those who are in
regular removal proceedings and appear before the immigration court.145
Effectively raising a Fourth Amendment challenge to administrative
removal would be a difficult task for an unrepresented, detained

do not appear anywhere in 1228”); see also id. (“Congress commanded only that someone other than the
charging officer preside over expedited removal proceedings and did so in a way that implies that
someone other than an IJ can hear the proceeding.”).
138. 813 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2015).
139. Id. at 138-42. This was because the court got past the jurisdictional issue, holding that
because the noncitizen has no opportunity to challenge the legal basis of his removal in administrative
removal proceedings, the INA’s administrative exhaustion requirement does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction. Id. at 138. The court held that because the procedures give no notice to the noncitizens that
they must raise all legal issues in response to Notice of Intent, but rather only allows the noncitizen to
contest issues of fact, the noncitizen had not failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 141-42.
140. Id. at 138-40.
141. Id. at 138-39; see also id. at 140 (describing procedures available to challenge an
administrative removal order and stating “[o]f course, all of these potential challenges are to be raised to
the presiding DHS officer, who, significantly, is not required to be an attorney or have any specialized
legal training.”).
142. Id. at 145.
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (no right to court-appointed counsel in removal proceedings
initiated under 8 U.S.C. § 1229).
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4)(B) (no right to court-appointed counsel in administrative removal
proceedings).
145. See New York Family Unity Project, Bronx Defenders, available at:
http://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project/ (last visited May
1, 2017).
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noncitizen.146 If the noncitizen secures counsel, the relatively quick
nature of the proceedings and deadlines for judicial review of the
administrative removal order itself would likely cause counsel to focus
all efforts on a petition for review in a circuit court of appeals.147 This
would leave little time for litigating a Fourth Amendment challenge to
the detention.
D. A Renewed Interest in the Fourth Amendment’s Guarantee of a
Probable Cause Hearing: the ICE Detainer Litigation
Although thus far there has been a dismal legal landscape for
challenges to expedited and administrative removal, it is entirely
possible that a court will take a fresh look at these procedures through
the lens of the Fourth Amendment. When one looks at the recent
successful litigation around ICE detainers,148 it appears that courts have
found a renewed interest in the Fourth Amendment right to a probable
cause finding when immigration agents authorize detention for the
purposes of deportation.
The ICE detainer is a request to state or local authorities to
“[m]aintain custody” of a person for an additional forty-eight hours, plus
weekends and holidays, “beyond the time when the subject would have
otherwise been released” from the state or local custody.149 When local
jails honored ICE’s request and refused to release a noncitizen until ICE
came to detain them, the noncitizens sued the state authorities for
146. See Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 10, at 9 (noting “the practical impediments
faced by those in administrative removal,” such as a “lack [of] information about judicial review” and
that because “the timeline for administrative removal is a short one (14 days), the likelihood is very high
that people are wrongfully removed before a court of law can conclude that a particular crime is not, in
fact, an aggravated felony”) .
147. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (deadline for petition for review of thirty days after the final order
of removal); 1252(a)(5) (providing that this statutory section is the sole means of judicial review of any
order of removal issued under the chapter, except for review of expedited removal, which is at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)).
148. See, e.g., Parada v. Anoka County, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128176, *19 (D. Minn. July 30,
2018) (finding local county honoring ICE detainer violated detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights);
Orellana v. Nobles Cty., 230 F.Supp. 3d 934, 944 (D. Minn. 2017) (immigration detainee’s continued
confinement after he would have been released on state charges of driving under the influence, pursuant
to ICE detainer, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment); Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F.Supp.
3d 999, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (granting summary judgment to class of individuals targeted by ICE
detainers on their claim that ICE's practice of issuing detainers without obtaining an arrest warrant was
prohibited by the INA and finding that that the warrantless arrest power of § 1357(a)(2) did not defeat
their claim because “immigration officers make no determination whatsoever that the subject of a
detainer is likely to escape upon release before a warrant can be obtained.”); Miranda-Olivares v.
Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317, 2014 WL 1414305, at *10 (D. Or. Ap. 11, 2014); see also ACLU,
ICE Detainers, supra note 7, at 3-4 (collecting cases where holding a noncitizen under ICE detainer was
found to be a new arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes).
149. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d).
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damages, arguing that this continued custody was a new “seizure” for
Fourth Amendment purposes, yet it lacked probable cause.150 Because
noncitizens enjoy the same rights as citizens when charged or held for a
crime,151 courts have responded to the unlawful seizure of a noncitizen
by the criminal justice system’s actors by analyzing their cases under
traditional Fourth Amendment principles.
In the detainer cases, one sees that it is not only criminal justice
actors, but also ICE agents, who violate the Fourth Amendment by
briefly detaining without probable cause persons they are investigating
for civil immigration violations.152 For example, in Morales v.
Chadbourne,153 the First Circuit in 2015 considered the case of a
naturalized U.S. citizen held pursuant to an ICE detainer for forty-eight
hours beyond her release from criminal custody.154 She sued both the
state officials who detained her and the ICE officials who issued the
detainer, seeking money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the state officials and pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics155 against the federal officials.156 ICE officials filed an
interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit, arguing that they had qualified
immunity because the law was not clear on whether an issuance of a
detainer violated her Fourth Amendment rights.157 Holding that her
Fourth Amendment rights clearly had been violated by the ICE officers,
the court unequivocally stated that the Fourth Amendment applied when
ICE officers authorized detention to verify whether someone was
present in violation of the immigration laws.158 In fact, the court found
(as was necessary to overcome a qualified immunity defense) the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to this context was so obvious
that “the existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional
150. See supra note 148 (summarizing ICE detainer litigation).
151. See D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented Immigrants and
the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 89-90 (2011) (discussing cases and briefs in which
courts and litigants assumed Fourth Amendment’s application to noncitizens); Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (“[D]etention for custodial interrogation – regardless of its label – intrudes so
severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional
safeguards against illegal arrests.”).
152. See ACLU, ICE Detainers, supra note 7.
153. 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015).
154. Id. at 211.
155. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
156. Morales, 793 F.3d at 213 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); see also Morales, 996
F.Supp.2d at 26.
157. Morales, 793 F.3d at 211-13.
158. Id. at 215-18. The court held that even though the state officials physically detained
Morales, the ICE officer who issued the detainer should have known that the natural consequences of
the act of issuing the detainer to state officials would cause her to be detained up to forty-eight hours.
Id. at 218.
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question beyond debate.”159
Morales also refreshingly separated out detention from deportation by
reasoning that ICE officials can go about their work determining
whether someone has violated the immigration laws; they must,
however, let the person out of jail while they undertake such
investigation.160 In Morales, the court stated, “we do not understand
why it would be more difficult to obtain the facts necessary to establish
probable cause for an individual who was detained in criminal custody
than for an individual who was walking freely in the community.”161 In
this way, courts deciding detainer cases have done a little work to undo
a central critique about the U.S. detention system, that during the early
debates on the U.S. government’s right to exclude and expel
noncitizens, “detention had never been separately considered from the
issue of expulsion,” which “proved to be a crucial omission” because of
the “distinct legal and moral concerns” raised by detention.162
Cases where detainers were lodged against U.S. citizens also
demonstrate the critical need for Fourth Amendments protections when
ICE agents detain those they believe are not citizens.163 Clearly ICE can
be mistaken, and Fourth Amendment rights should guard against such
erroneous detention.164 As the late Justice Scalia wrote, “[t]he common159. Id. at 214 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)). The Morales court cited what
appears to be perfectly consistent Supreme Court precedent finding that the Fourth Amendment applies
to arrests for deportation and not just arrests by the police for investigation of criminal conduct. Id. at
215 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878); see also id. at 215 (citing Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216)
(“[D]etention for custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal
arrest.”).
160. Id. at 218.
161. Id. at 218; see also id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(1)) (reasoning that “federal regulations
permit an immigration officer ‘to ask any questions of anyone as long as the immigration officer does
not restrain the freedom of an individual’”).
162. See Daniel Wilshire, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 6 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2012); see also Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1339 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“In effect, the majority is moving from the uncontroverted propositions that
the political branches of plenary authority over deciding whom to admit into the country and that such
political decisions are largely immune from judicial review, to the unsupportable conclusion that how it
treats those whom it detains while the deportation is underway is likewise beyond judicial review. This
is an unwarranted judicial leap.”).
163. See, e.g., Morales, 793 F.3d at 214; see also Mendia v. Garcia, 165 F.Supp.3d 861, 869-71
(N.D.Ca. 2016) (extending Bivens money damages against ICE officers who issued a detainer against a
U.S. citizen); Brown v. Ramsay, Case No. 4:18-cv-10279 (S.D.Fl.), complaint (filed Dec. 3, 2018),
available at https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/peter-sean-brown-v-richard-ramsay-complaint; Isaac
Stanley-Becker, Born in Philadelphia, U.S. Citizen Says He Was Held for Deportation to Jamaica at
ICE’s
Request,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Dec.
4,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/12/04/born-philadelphia-us-citizen-says-he-was-helddeportation-jamaica-ices-request/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9410dbbfbb8b.
164. One district court, finding that ICE officials could not claim qualified immunity due to the
lack of clarity on Fourth Amendment law for wrongfully issuing a detainer, stated:
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law rule of prompt hearing [which became the precursor to the Fourth
Amendment right]165 had as its primary beneficiaries the innocent—not
those whose fully justified convictions must be overturned to scold the
police . . . but those so blameless that there was not even good reason to
arrest them.”166
The detainer cases have verified that the seizure of a person being
investigated for civil immigration violations without probable cause is
an obvious Fourth Amendment violation.167 Do these cases mark a
turning point, where the Fourth Amendment suddenly applies in this
context, or have the Fourth Amendment rights always existed? How
have noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment rights fared when faced with
immigration law’s exceptionalism? In the next section, I seek to answer
these questions and provide a framework for seeing the Fourth
Amendment violations in immigration enforcement practices such as
expedited and administrative removal.
III. A FRAMEWORK TO SEE IMMIGRATION LAW’S NEXT FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROBLEM
The core concerns of the Fourth Amendment – the right not to be
unreasonably seized by a government actor – exist in the immigration
enforcement context. Why should Fourth Amendment rights apply
when deportation is civil, not punishment,168 and therefore the
procedural protections of a criminal trial do not apply?169 The Fourth
Amendment question is not whether what occurs after the seizure is

The fact that Mr. Galarza is Hispanic and was working at a construction site with three other
Hispanic men—two of whom are citizens of foreign countries and another who claimed to
have been born in Puerto Rico but is a citizen of the Dominican Republic—does not amount
to probable cause to believe that Mr. Galarza is an alien not lawfully present in the United
States.
Galarza v. Szalczyk, 2012 WL 1080020, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012). ICE officers later reached a
settlement, so the appeal of the case to the Third Circuit involved only claims against the county
officials. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 638 (3d Cir. 2014).
165. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
166. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. See, e.g., Morales, 793 F.3d at 214; Galarza, 2012 WL 10080020, at *14.
168. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (holding that deportation is
not punishment). In the facetious words of Dan Kanstroom, “they are not being punished, they are
simply being regulated.” Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2000).
169. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011) (arguing
for the right to court-appointed counsel in deportation proceedings); Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in
Immigration Court, 23 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 675 (2015) (arguing for the right to confront witnesses
in deportation proceedings).
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punishment.170 These are the questions that should be asked: Has there
has been a seizure? Is this a person who can claim Fourth Amendment
protections? Was the seizure unreasonable? If the answer to the first
three questions are yes, then what should the remedy be?
When discussing an appropriate remedy, questions regarding the
purpose of such proceeding become relevant, especially when that
remedy is sought within the context of a civil proceeding.171 For this
reason, in U.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme in 1984 decided that the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule did not extend to illegal arrests
by the immigration authorities.172 Because the Court held that a
deportation proceeding is civil, it balanced the social benefits against the
costs of applying the exclusionary rule, finding that the costs
outweighed the benefits of applying the rule.173 The Court held that it
would rule differently, however, if the Fourth Amendment violations by
INS officers were widespread, or if there was an egregious Fourth
Amendment violation that “might transgress notions of fundamental
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”174
There has been significant scholarly critique of this case for its watereddown application of an important remedy to Fourth Amendment
violations by immigration officers.175 Yet Lopez-Mendoza dealt with
only with one possible remedy for an illegal arrest,176 and created one

170. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S at
354) (discussing how Fourth Amendment violation is “‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an
unreasonable governmental intrusion,” regardless of whether the evidence gained from the Fourth
Amendment violation is later introduced at trial).
171. See Immigration & Naturalization v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041-50 (1984); see
also infra Part IVb (discussing remedies for Fourth Amendment violation).
172. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041-50.
173. Id. (applying test from United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)). The Court also decided
that if it applied the exclusionary rule to release a person from custody, that person would immediately
resume the “commission of a crime through their continuing, unlawful presence in this country.” Id. at
1050. The Court stated, “The constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go free, but we have never
suggested that it allows the criminal to continue in the commission of an ongoing crime.” Id. at 1047.
174. Id. at 1050-51.
175. See, e.g., David Gray et. al., The Supreme Court's Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91
TEX. L. REV. 7, 25 (2012) (criticizing Lopez-Mendoza Court’s reasoning that law enforcement officers
are primarily interested in criminal law enforcement, not immigration enforcement, and that imposing
the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings therefore offers little or no additional deterrence
benefit beyond that provided by the threat of suppression in criminal trials); Jennifer Chacón, A
Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Protections, 59 DUKE L. J. 1563, 1624–27 (2010) (proposing the application of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings); Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe:” Widespread
Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting LopezMendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2008) (arguing for an application of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule due to widespread constitutional violations by immigration officers and a fundamental
change in immigration court practice since Lopez-Mendoza was decided).
176. Kagan, supra note 7, at 147-48.
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more exception to the exclusionary rule.177 The Lopez-Mendoza Court
said little about other remedies for Fourth Amendment violations by
immigration officers,178 leaving the door open to the exploration of other
possible remedies.
When framing the Fourth Amendment questions in the manner that I
have set forth, one can see that the core concerns of the Fourth
Amendment are applicable in the immigration enforcement context
notwithstanding immigration law’s plenary power. The plenary power
of the political branches over immigration law has long sounded the
death knell for many constitutional challenges to immigration agents’
actions.179 Yet, in 1973, in Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.,180 the Supreme
Court applied the Fourth Amendment when a Mexican citizen
challenged the warrantless search of his car by Border Patrol.181 While
the Court recognized that the plenary power of the political branches
over decisions regarding the admission of noncitizens permitted such
routine searches at the border,182 such a search violated the noncitizen’s
Fourth Amendment rights when it did not occur at the border or the
“functional equivalent of the border”183 – which the Court refused to
extend twenty miles beyond the border.184 In the 1975 decision United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,185 the Court suppressed statements admitting
illegal presence made by passengers in a car that was subjected to a
warrantless random stop by Border Patrol.186 The Court found that the
single factor—“the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants”—was
177. See Allegra M. McLeod, Immigration, Criminalization, and Disobedience, 70 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 556, 568 (2016) (quoting Ronald Jay Allen, William J. Stuntz, et al, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
INVESTIGATION AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 2d ed. 449 (2011)) (“[T]he exclusionary rule
itself is subject to so many exceptions that in fact, ‘cumulatively, the exceptions may be the rule.’”).
178. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045 (discussing the possibility of declaratory relief for
Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers).
179. Hiroshi Motomura, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (“[C]ourts, citing the plenary power
doctrine, have been reluctant to ask seriously if immigration law decisions by Congress and the
executive are unconstitutional. With some exceptions, courts have ceded decision making to Congress
and the executive branch of government.”).
180. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
181. Id. at 267. The Border Patrol agents did not assert that they had probable cause or even
reasonable suspicion that would have justified the stop. Id. at 268. The government defended the search
by claiming authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), which permitted warrantless searches of automobiles
“within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,” which the regulations
described as 100 miles from the border. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 287(a)(3 and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1).
182. Id. at 272.
183. Id. at 272-73.
184. Id. at 273. The Court suggested that “searches at an established station near the border, at a
point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border, might be functional
equivalents of border searches.” Id.
185. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
186. Id.
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not enough to furnish reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car
were not citizens.187 The Court wrote that the plenary power “cannot
diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken
for aliens.”188 Although Brignoni-Ponce is known to many scholars as
the decision that authorized racial profiling in immigration
enforcement,189 it is also frequently cited for the principle that the
Fourth Amendment applies to immigration enforcement actions.190
There is no doubt that the detention that occurs within the context of
administrative and expedited removals is a “seizure” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. The bars, shackles, and cells that
immigration detainees endure are significantly more intrusive than the
brief stops by law enforcement that may occur, for example, at a fixed
border checkpoint,191 or when the police stop motorists at a checkpoint
187. Id. at 876, 885-86. The Court made suggestions of what would serve as reasonable
suspicion: a driver’s erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade officers; characteristics of the vehicle,
such as certain station wagons or vehicles that are heavily loaded with passengers, or vehicles where
persons appear to be trying to hide; and “the characteristic appearance of people who live in Mexico,
relying on such factors as the mode of dress or haircut.” Id. Subsequent courts have discussed whether
such use of apparent Latino heritage could factor into the reasonableness determination. See, e.g., U.S.
v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]t this point in our nation’s history, and given
the continuing changes in our ethnic and racial composition, Hispanic appearance is, in general, of such
little probative value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor where particularized or
individualized suspicion is required.”); but see U.S. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 n.6 (9th Cir.
2006) (reasoning that the court’s decision in Montero-Camargo did not apply because unlike the
location of the arrest in Montero-Camargo, where Latinos were the majority, in the case at hand,
“Havre, Montana, is sparsely populated with Hispanics”).
188. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. Although this passage about the plenary power suggests
that the Court was only concerned about citizens who were mistaken for noncitizens, the Court then
stated, “[f]or the same reasons that the Fourth Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to
inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally in the country, it also forbids stopping or detaining
persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be
aliens.” Id.
189. See Devon W. Carbado and Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2011); Johnson, Racial Profiling, supra note 8, at 1027 (2010) (“Today, race
dominates immigration enforcement, in no small part due to the Court’s sanctioning of the reliance on
‘Mexican appearance’ in Brignoni-Ponce.”); see also id. at 1036-37 (“Many Latino/as in the United
States today firmly believe that race is determinative to immigration officers investigating alleged
violations of the U.S. immigration laws. Evidence supports this assertion.”).
190. See U.S. v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). There was no
suggestion that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because it was Border Patrol made the search,
because it was a noncitizen or suspected noncitizen whose rights were violated, or because the search
was made for the purpose of enforcing civil immigration law. But cf. U.S. v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d
281, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (Weiner, J., dissenting) (discussing Brignoni-Ponce as “the judiciary’s
evisceration of the Fourth Amendment in the vicinity of the Mexican border”); Carbado and Harris,
supra note 189, at 1570-73 (noting that the “undocumented cases” such as Brignoni-Ponce operated to
expand courts’ willingness to authorize racial profiling in criminal procedure cases outside of the
immigration context). I also recognize that, while appearing to be a win, Brignoni-Ponce could be
described as a “defeat in disguise” for giving broad discretion to border patrol in making stops and
lowering the standard from probable cause to reasonable suspicion for this type of stop. See Johnson,
Racial Profiling, supra note 8, at 1024-25.
191. See U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (finding no Fourth Amendment
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to ask about a recent crime.192 Traffic stops are annoying and
inconvenient;193 immigration detention is a euphemism for
imprisonment.194 As David Cole has written, “few state actions are
more serious than locking up a human being.”195
A question that has gained increasing relevance since 1990, when the
Court decided United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,196 is whether
undocumented noncitizens are part of “the people” protected by the
Fourth Amendment. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that a
Mexican citizen could not claim suppression as a remedy for a Fourth
Amendment violation when U.S. federal agents searched his properties
in Mexico after he had been arrested in Mexico and extradited to the
United States for prosecution.197 The Court examined the history of the
Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the people” and found that unlike
other amendments (such as the Fifth Amendment that applies to
“persons” and the Sixth Amendment that applies to the “accused”), the
Fourth Amendment only applies to citizens of the U.S. or those with
voluntary substantial connections to the political community of the
U.S.198
Because he had not established “voluntary substantial
connections” to the U.S., Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez could not claim Fourth
Amendment rights.199 The Court suggested, however, that the Fourth
Amendment should apply to noncitizens who are illegally in the U.S.200
violation when officers refer motorists selectively, without reasonable suspicion, to secondary
inspection at border checkpoint for questioning regarding immigration status).
192. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424-45 (2004).
193. See id. at 425-26; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558 (quoting U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
894-95 (1975) (“The circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than
those attending roving-patrol stop.”).
194. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97
B.U. L. REV. 245 (2017); Malik Ndaula with Debbie Satyal, Rafiu’s Story: An American Immigrant
Nightmare, in KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
TODAY 241, 250 (David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas eds., 2008) (“They call immigration
detention civil confinement, but prison is prison no matter what label you use, and prison breaks
people’s souls, hearts, and even minds.”).
195. Cole, In Aid of Removal, supra note 8, at 1008.
196. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
197. Id. at 274-75.
198. Id. at 265-67.
199. Id. at 271, 274-75.
200. Id. at 272-73 (reasoning that “the illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States
voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations,” which distinguished their cases
from that of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez, who “had no voluntary connections with this country that might
place him among ‘the people’ of the United States.”). Courts have disagreed about whether the plurality
opinion’s discussion with respect to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to “illegal aliens” is dicta or
binding precedent, since Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, wrote “[i]f the search had occurred in
a residence within the United States, I would have little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth
Amendment would apply”). Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-411(KC), 2005 WL 388589 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005),
aff’d and remanded, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that a border crossing-card holder had Fourth
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Carolina Núñez discusses how the Court’s Verdugo-Urquidez opinion
marked a key moment in the Court’s emerging “post-territorial”
approach to membership that rejects territorial presence as an accurate
measure of membership for noncitizens.201 Rather, she writes, “the postterritorial approach looks to more substantive indicators of membership,
including community ties and mutuality of obligation, to afford
rights.”202 Of particular concern should be the voluntariness with which
someone came to the U.S.;203 the status that one holds should be less
relevant to one’s membership and ensuing rights because a status-based
approach “values the state’s consent above all else [territorial presence,
community ties, or any other factors].”204 She writes that courts should
be evaluating membership and the ensuing Fourth Amendment rights
guaranteed to members of the U.S. community by looking not at proxies
such as status, but at a more complex theory of membership, such as
community ties and mutuality of obligation.205
Following Núñez’ reasoning, noncitizens in administrative and
expedited removal have voluntary connections to the U.S. that have
ensured a mutuality of obligation. They have every intent to join the
U.S. community, and many have lived here for up to two years or more,
Amendment rights and stating that “[t]he definition of ‘the people’ advanced in Verdugo-Urquidez is
therefore considered as persuasive authority to the extent it applies to resolution of the present motion
for summary judgment.”); United States v. Guttierez, 983 F.Supp. 905, 915 (N.D.Cal.1998) (“It is also
noteworthy that a majority of the justices did not subscribe to Chief Justice Rehnquist's [VerdugoUrquidez] opinion, particularly with respect to his discussion and analysis regarding the scope of the
Fourth Amendment as it applies to illegal aliens,” rev'd on other grounds by United States v. Guttierez,
203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir.1999); but see United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1261 (D.
Utah 2003) (“This court is not at liberty to second-guess Justice Kennedy's direct statement that he was
joining the Court's opinion.”).
201. Núñez, supra note 151, at 85-86. Núñez was writing in response to some district courts that
interpreted Verdugo-Urquidez’s “substantial connections” test as a reason to deny Fourth Amendment
rights to those who were deported from the U.S. and reentered illegally. See, e.g., United States v.
Gutierrez-Casada, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1272 (D. Kan. 2008) (reasoning that because the defendant had
been “justifiably expelled” from the United States by virtue of his deportation, “his very presence in this
country is ‘wrongful,’ and his expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion is not ‘one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”); United States v. Ullah, No. 04-CR-30A(F), 2005 WL
629487, at *99 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005), aff'd in part, adopted in part, No. 04-CR-030A, 2006 WL
1994678 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2006); United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1271 (D.
Utah 2003), aff’d, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004) (“it appears that all previously deported alien felons
stand outside “the People” covered by the Fourth Amendment.”); but see Guitterez, 983 F.Supp. at 915
(finding that a noncitizen who is illegally present in the U.S. need not first establish “voluntary
connections” to the U.S. before asserting a Fourth Amendment violation).
202. Núñez, supra note 151, at 86; see also id. 129 (“Verdugo could just as easily have ended up
Canada or Honduras--his location was completely involuntary. He clearly had no ties—nor wanted
any—to the United States and had no sense of obligation to U.S. law.”).
203. Id. at 112 (“Clearly, Verdugo's lack of sufficient connections cannot be attributable to
unauthorized status. Rather, the Court specifically noted that Verdugo's presence in the United States
was involuntary; Verdugo did not manifest any willing submission to U.S. law.”).
204. Id. at 122.
205. Id. at 137.
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forming the substantive indictors of membership that would afford
Fourth Amendment rights.206 That the U.S. has not consented to their
presence by affording them an immigration status should matter less.
Victor Romero writes that the Fourth Amendment “should be about
creating a floor of rights, beneath which the United States government
may not fall.”207 He looks at immigrants’ rights to public benefits as an
entirely different issue, one that is about establishing a “ceiling of
immigrant benefits.”208
Yet, immigration law’s “adherence to
immigration classifications” may have led courts, following VerdugoUrquidez, to engage in such analysis of a noncitizen’s classification
within immigration law prior to allowing him to assert Fourth
Amendment rights.209 Romero examines changes in tort law that govern
a landowner’s liability for injuries to entrants upon her land to draw an
analogy to the Fourth Amendment question.210 Just like a landowner,
who under the tort reforms now owes the same duty of care regardless
of whether the person injured is an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser,
the U.S. government owes a duty to not unreasonably seize a lawful
permanent resident, visa holder, or undocumented noncitizen.211
The adherence to immigration classification finds its place more
commonly in a Due Process analysis under the Fifth Amendment.
There, lawful permanent residents stand above all other noncitizens to
claim the strongest Due Process protections.212 Fourth Amendment
questions are different, though.
When considering the Fourth
Amendment, the question should not be whether the person, by coming

206. See id.; but see Victor Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?
Undocumented Immigrants’ Rights After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1015 (1992) (discussing difficulty, under Verdugo-Urquidez, of
drawing temporal line for substantial connections of an undocumented noncitizen who came to the U.S.
and remained for a short period of time before being arrested).
207. Victor Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: On
Gutierrez and the Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 62 (2000).
208. Id. at 59-62.
209. Id. at 63; see also supra note 201 (describing cases).
210. Romero, Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights, supra note 207, at 64, 79-89.
211. Id. at 79-82. Romero acknowledges that the purposes of private tort law differ substantially
from those of constitutional or immigration law. Id. at 88. However, he writes, “both types of law seek
to deter undesirable conduct.” Id. In Fourth Amendment law, the threat of excluding evidence because
of police misconduct and the threat of a Bivens suit both act as deterrents to unreasonable governmental
conduct. Id. at 88-89.
212. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE
L. J. 2394, 2397 (2013) (“[C]lassic due process analysis…requires guaranteed counsel for lawful
permanent residents, the group of noncitizens most likely to have the strongest legal entitlement to
remain in, as well as the likelihood of having the deepest community ties to, the United States.”); Peter
Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature
of Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 289, 292 (2008) (“Permanent residents, as a class,
have the greatest economic and familial connections and political allegiance to the United States.”).
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to the U.S. illegally or committing a crime,213 deserves to be
unreasonably seized.214 Shouldn’t the right to be free from unreasonable
seizure by governmental authorities involve questions of human dignity
that are the same regardless of status? Scholars have answered this
question affirmatively.215 Or, the focal point should be deterring the
government from unreasonably seizing a person,216 not the status of the
person who was seized.217 Suggesting that some people in the U.S.
deserve to be illegally seized by the U.S. government is a slippery
slope.218 Can they also be subjected to a year at hard labor? The
Supreme Court, writing at the “very height of deference to plenary
immigration power,”219 answered this question in the negative.220
The next question is whether the seizure is reasonable.221 Is the
seizure at issue reasonable because its purpose is not primarily to
investigate crime, but to enforce a civil regulatory scheme?222 In the

213. Cf. Demore, 538 U.S. at 518-21, 524-26 (detention without bond pending deportation did not
violate Due Process because statute authorizing detention applied to a narrow group of those Congress
deemed most dangerous, those deportable for certain types of crimes, including aggravated felonies, and
detention was brief).
214. Romero, supra note 206, at 1016 (“The focus of the Fourth Amendment is on what the
government can and cannot do, not on against whom its actions may be taken.”).
215. See generally Jonathan Simon, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT
DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA ch. 6 (New Press 2014); see also Medina, supra
note 32, at 193 (“Substitution of the word ‘citizen’ for the word ‘person’ or ‘individual’ [when
referencing Fourth Amendment rights] erects a barrier between classes of persons that negates the basic
humanity common to all.”); Romero, supra note 206, at 1018 (“The characterization of the Fourth
Amendment as embodying an inherent human right would be consistent with American’s traditional
commitment to the international human rights movement. The international human rights movement
purports the existence of a minimum cluster of rights that should be enjoyed by all.”).
216. See William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Remedy, 88 GEO. L. J. 799, 800-01, 825-827 (2000) (discussing how modern Court has come to view
exclusion as a remedy instead of a constitutional requirement, and that the aim of exclusion is to deter
police illegality in the context of evidence-gathering for criminal trials); Romero, supra note 207, at 8889 (discussing Bivens and exclusion as remedies that have as their primary purpose deterrence).
217. See Romero, supra note 207, at 88-89.
218. See id. at 62 (discussing erosion of Fourth Amendment rights for both undocumented
noncitizens but also legal noncitizens should Verdugo-Urquidez be read to make Fourth Amendment
rights turn on the status of the person asserting them); see also Carbado and Harris, supra note 189, at
1016 (discussing how cases involving Fourth Amendment issues for undocumented noncitizens have
operated to erode Fourth Amendment rights in cases involving citizens).
219. Cole, supra note 8, at 1016 (citing Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 (1896)).
220. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235-37 (holding that Congress may authorize temporary
detention in order to facilitate deportation but may not subject Chinese citizens to a year at hard labor
prior to deportation without the protections of a criminal trial).
221. See Robert M. Bloom, Border Searches in the Age of Terrorism, 78 MISS. L. J. 295, 299
(2008) (describing reasonableness as “touchstone” for Fourth Amendment rights).
222. Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (declining to suspend usual
requirement of individualized suspicion where the police set up a non-border checkpoint “primarily for
the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes”).
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1967 case that introduced an “administrative search doctrine,”223
Camara v. Municipal Court,224 the Supreme Court permitted health
inspectors to search houses without individualized suspicion of a
violation.225 The Court, however, still required an “area warrant” issued
by a judge so as to limit the discretion of each inspector.226 In the
seizures at issue in administrative and expedited removals, there is no
judicial warrant whatsoever to limit the DHS officer’s discretion, and
yet the intrusion is significantly more – the taking away of physical
liberty, not the search of one’s house. Nor does it seem plausible that
the noncitizen, by coming illegally to the U.S. or committing a crime,
has a reduced expectation of privacy that would justify his detention, as
would the owner of a “closely regulated” industry whose business
property may be subject to warrantless inspection.227
Are there “special needs”228 that would justify seizures of all persons
subject to expedited and administrative removal (which may number
close to 500,000 for expedited removal and 10,000 for administrative
removal)?229 Border control has been justified as a special need;230 for
this reason, briefly detaining noncitizens who present themselves at the
border or port-of-entry in order to issue an expedited removal order
would likely pass a reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment.231
However, seizing and jailing thousands of people suspected of

223. See Bloom, supra note 221, at 303.
224. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
225. Id. at 536-37.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987).
228. See New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (setting forth
three-part test for reasonableness of warrantless inspections of commercial properties); see also
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79-81 (2001) (hospital’s sharing of diagnostic tests for
pregnant women with police not justified by special need even if ultimate purpose is to protect the
health of the mother and child); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety
checkpoint is special law enforcement concern that justifies highway stop without individualized
suspicion).
229. See Jose Magaña-Salgado, Fair Treatment Denied: The Trump Administration’s Troubling
Attempt to Expand “Fast-Track” Deportations, at 4, Immigrant Legal Resource Center (June 2017),
available at: https://www.ilrc.org/report-expedited-removal-expansion (predicting that if expedited
removal begins to apply to those who have been in the U.S. for up to two years, the procedures will be
used in an additional 328,440 cases); Koh, supra note 4, at 194 (reporting number of expedited removals
in fiscal year 2015 as 165,935); Wadhia, supra note 10, at 3 (reporting number of administrative
removals in fiscal year 2013 as 9,217).
230. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552-53, 556-557 (finding that stops of motorists at
permanent checkpoints near the border are justified by the important law enforcement concern of
policing a southern border that is 2,000 miles long); see also Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424 (describing border
patrol checkpoint at issue in Martinez-Fuerte as justified by special law enforcement concerns).
231. See U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541-43 (1985) (permitting detention for
sixteen hours at an international border based on reasonable suspicion by customs agents that she was
smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal).
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immigration violations who are found anywhere within the interior of
the U.S. is a far cry from the brief stops of vehicles or persons, which
are justified when they occur at a border checkpoint or port-of-entry.232
Thus, the reasonableness of the seizures and subsequent detentions
involved in administrative and expedited removal should be made on a
case-by-case basis.233 I argue that the reasonableness of each detainee’s
seizure should be answered by a neutral immigration judge, not a DHS
supervisor.
There are undoubtedly critiques about a proposal that uses
immigration judges to provide such hearings, especially given Congress’
intent to create streamlined proceedings with administrative and
expedited removal. In the next section, I seek to answer these policy
concerns and propose a remedy for this Fourth Amendment violation.
IV. A PROPOSED REMEDY
The remedy of immigration judge review of detention for
administrative and expedited removal would alleviate some of the
critiques of these “shadow” deportations,234 since an immigration judge
would review the justification ICE or CBP presents for the noncitizen’s
detention. This remedy could have the effect of adding an additional
layer of review in what were intended to be streamlined, “fast-track”
removal procedures, because the involvement of an immigration judge
would necessarily slow down the procedures.235 This is not a bad
outcome, given the critique of these procedures for their poor
institutional design236 and likelihood of error,237 among others. The fasttrack procedures would remain in place, however, with respect to the
removal order, since the lack of a probable cause hearing would not
automatically cause the expedited or administrative removal order to be
invalid. Just like in Gerstein, where the Court reasoned that an illegal

232. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557; United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152
(2004) (“The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its
zenith at the international border.”); Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533, 538 (viewing airport as
“international border” for purposes of applying Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry for
detention by customs officers); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (“That searches
made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and
examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact
that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration.”).
233. Cf. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 564-66 (permitting border checkpoint without issuance of
an “area” warrant by a judge).
234. See generally Koh, supra note 4.
235. See id. at 200.
236. See Family, supra note 11, at 646.
237. See Frost, supra note 15.
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arrest does not void a subsequent conviction,238 the lack of a probable
cause hearing would merely render the illegal detention invalid, not the
removal order that followed the illegal detention.
A. Why Have a Probable Cause Hearing Before an Immigration Judge?
There certainly will be critics who respond that this proposal gives
DHS inadequate time to prepare their case. Without detention, someone
could easily abscond.239 However, this proposal requires that ICE or
CBP justify detention to a judge by proving probable cause to detain. In
the case of administrative removal, ICE would prove probable cause that
the person is not a lawful permanent resident and has been convicted of
an aggravated felony.240 Criminal records should not be difficult for
ICE to obtain, given their regular cooperation with state authorities241
and relatively easy access to such records for bond hearings before
immigration judges.242 If the person detained is actually a lawful
permanent resident and therefore not subject to such streamlined
procedures, the probable cause hearing provides an opportunity to
correct this error.
For expedited removal cases, there is less information available to the
government about someone who has just crossed the border or has been
living illegally in the U.S.243 However, because a noncitizen stopped at
the border or port-of-entry must prove that he or she is entitled to be
admitted, the burden lies with the noncitizen to present a valid visa.244
For those who entered without inspection, the government must first
prove alienage; then the burden then shifts to the noncitizen to prove
presence in the U.S. prior to a lawful admission or that he or she is
clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted.245 In many cases, it
may be relatively simple for the government to prove to the judge that
the person is not a citizen, and any disputes about the validity of the
person’s visa can be addressed at the probable cause hearing. And, it is
important to note that “probable cause” is not an incredibly high
238. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119 (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)).
239. See Martin, supra note 43, at 702-03.
240. See generally Part IIc.
241. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
242. See Holper, supra note 81, at 117-18.
243. See Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper,” 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J.
667, 672 (1997) (“When an alien comes into INS custody . . . the agency probably knows little or
nothing about him. Moreover, the agency cannot readily obtain reliable information about him unless
he has previously been criminal convicted or was otherwise in the custody of some government
agency.”).
244. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (noncitizen seeking admission must prove that he or she is
“clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted”).
245. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c).
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standard of proof; certainly it is lower than the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard that is required for deportability.246 If it is too
difficult for the government to promptly prove alienage, one might
query whether the government should be detaining someone at all under
the immigration laws, given that there is a possibility that the person
could be a citizen.247 If immigration law’s presumption of citizenship is
to mean anything,248 it should mean DHS has to prove its detention
decisions to a neutral judge.
Do the “escape valves” to both administrative removal and expedited
removal resolve the concerns presented in this article? There are “fearbased” escape valves, which allow for a noncitizen who would
otherwise be subject to administrative or expedited removal to express a
fear of return and see an asylum officer, who may refer that person’s
case to an immigration judge.249 These fear based-escape valves to a
procedure that would otherwise not involve a judge ensure U.S.
compliance with its obligations under the Refugee Convention to not
return a person to a country where it is likely he would fear
persecution.250 Also, there is an escape valve that provides automatic
referral to an immigration judge for someone in expedited removal who
swears to be a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, refugee, or
asylee, and for whom the DHS officer does not confirm such status.251
No such automatic review by an immigration judge exists in
administrative removal; rather, the DHS officer can make a
discretionary referral to an immigration judge if the officer finds that
246. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966) (standard for deportation is clear,
convincing, and unequivocal evidence); see also California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana
Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 n.6 (1981) (defining “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” as “a higher
probability than is required by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard”); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111112 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (defining “probable cause” as “facts and
circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was
committing an offense”); id. at 121 (reasoning that probable cause “does not require the file resolution
of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands”).
247. See Morales, 793 F.3d at 215-18 (in Bivens action against ICE officials for issuing a detainer
against a U.S. citizen, reasoning that ICE can conduct its investigation into the immigration status of a
person without detaining her).
248. See Holper, supra note 81, at 113-14 (discussing presumption of citizenship in immigration
law).
249. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(b)(4); 235.3(b)(4); 238.1(f)(3).
250. Refugee protections were codified in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee
Protocol, to which the U.S. acceded in 1968. By signing the Protocol, the United States became bound
by articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention. 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954), 19 U.S.T. 6259,
6278, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968). The concept of nonrefoulement, or nonreturn, appears in Article 33.1
of the Refugee Convention, which states that “no contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.”
Refugee Convention Art. 33.1.
251. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(i).
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administrative removal is not appropriate.252
While these procedures to protect those with a valid claim to refugee
protection or lawful status will catch some otherwise faulty expedited
and administrative removals (so long as officers ask the mandated
questions),253 these protections do not ensure freedom from detention
during such review.254 Indeed, as Jennifer Koh has written, while
awaiting a reasonable fear determination for those in reinstatement of
removal (the same procedures that would apply to those in
administrative removal with fear-based claims),255 individuals have been
held in immigration detention for over a year.256 Thus, assuming for a
moment that these escape valves work properly and screen out the cases
where there is the greatest likelihood of error, they provide no redress
for the Fourth Amendment concern about being free from an unlawful
seizure.
Some may argue that a noncitizen can simply give up and agree to
deportation; he or she thus holds the ticket out of jail. However, the
statute and regulations contemplate that persons subject to these
procedures have claims that may entitle them to an immigration judge
hearing; hence, the escape valves.257 Asking a person to give up a valid
claim in order to be free from detention proved to be an unsatisfactory
solution when it was presented to courts as an option for long-term
mandatory detainees whose detention became prolonged because they
continued to fight meritorious claims for relief.258
Is asking an immigration judge to conduct this task the equivalent of
asking a truly neutral magistrate judge to review detention for probable
cause? As immigration judge Dana Leigh Marks has noted,

252. See 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d).
253. See U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Barriers to Protection: The
Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, at 2 (2016), available at:
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf (stating concerns about CBP
officers’ interviewing practices and the reliability of the records they create, including: flawed Border
Patrol internal guidance that conflates CBP’s role with that of USCIS; certain CBP officers’ outright
skepticism, if not hostility, toward asylum claims; and inadequate quality assurance procedures).
254. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(i); § 238.1(g).
255. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31 (for reinstatement of removal and administrative removal, outlining
same procedures for requesting reasonable fear interview with an asylum officer).
256. Koh, supra note 4, at 205 (citing Complaint, Alfaro Garcia v. Johnson, No. 14-cv-01775
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014)).
257. See supra notes 249-252.
258. See, e.g., Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 2015),
abrogated in part and on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 847 (2018) (“We
cannot ‘effectively punish’ these aliens for choosing to exercise their legal right to challenge the
Government’s case against them.”); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An alien who
would not normally be subject to indefinite detention cannot be so detained merely because he seeks to
explore avenues of relief that the law makes available to him.”).
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[T]he immigration court system is housed in a law enforcement
agency, the Department of Justice, which is closely aligned with
those who are the prosecutors in our courts (Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) trial counsel).
This structural
arrangement has caused many members of the public we serve, and
the attorneys who represent them, to doubt our decisional
independence.259
This lack of neutrality is made worse when there are allegations of
politics playing into the hiring of immigration judges, as happened
during the George W. Bush administration.260 Stephen Legomsky has
proposed reforming the Executive Office for Immigration Review,
converting immigration judges into administrative law judges.261 Others
have called for the creation of an Article I immigration court, akin to the
Tax Court.262 Should these proposals occur, we can expect immigration
judges to move in the direction of a truly neutral judge. Even under the
current structure, immigration judges are bound by regulation to
exercise their discretion independently.263 And, at the very least,
detentions pursuant to expedited and administrative removal procedures
that currently are made entirely in the “shadows” will be examined by a
judge for validity.264 Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, because
the probable cause decision involves a judge’s evaluation of whether a
noncitizen is actually removable as DHS has alleged, it makes sense that
it be an immigration judge, who makes these decisions on a daily basis,
who presides over these hearings.265
259. Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?, 54:4 AMERICAN BAR ASSN.
JUDGES’ JOURNAL 120, 21-22 (Fall 2015).
260. See Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Applicant Says Trump Administration Blocked Her Over
Politics, CNN (June 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/immigration-judge-applicantsays-trump-administration-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html; U.S. Department of Justice, An
Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and other Staff in the Office of
the
Attorney
General
(July
28,
2008),
69,
available
at
http://
www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf (concluding that members of the Bush administration
violated civil service laws and departmental policy in selecting candidates for immigration judge
positions based on political ties and recommendations rather than professional qualifications).
261. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L. J.
1635, 1640 (2010).
262. See, e.g., Am. Bar Assn., Report on Reforming the Immigration System (2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/coi_complete
_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf; Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish
an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 3-4, 10-11 (2008).
263. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10.
264. Jennifer Koh has warned that emphasizing the shortcomings of summary removal
proceedings “may have the unintended effect of making immigration court seem like a relatively
favorable venue.” Koh, supra note 4, at 232. However, as she notes, “where deficiencies in
immigration courts exist, their shadows are likely even worse.” Id.
265. Even the Court in Riverside recognized that there should be some flexibility in the provision
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There of course is the added problem of cost; immigration judges
have a crushing caseload, with half a million cases pending as of
February 2017.266 Judges already will have an increased caseload, given
that DHS has changed its enforcement priorities in the Trump
administration, which means that fewer noncitizen’s cases will be taken
off judges’ dockets through the use of prosecutorial discretion
mechanisms such as administrative closure.267 Although the hiring of
more immigration judges has been a priority of the Trump
administration, filling a vacancy can take up to two years, so judges’
dockets will not be cleared up anytime soon.268
Cost, however, should not guide courts in their Fourth Amendment
analysis; this is unlike the consideration that courts may give to cost
when litigants demand more procedures under the Fifth Amendment
Due Process clause, invoking Mathews v. Eldridge.269 In the criminal
justice context, probable cause hearings come with a financial cost, yet
the Court in Gerstein and Riverside did not weigh that cost in
determining the value or necessity of such hearings.270 Indeed, in the
ICE detainer litigation, cost was not a consideration, given that courts
of a prompt probable cause hearing. See Riverside, 500 U.S. at 57. There the flexibility involved more
time; here the flexibility would involve using an immigration judge, not a truly neutral magistrate judge.
266. See Madison Park, By the Numbers: Why Immigration Cases Take So Long, CNN (Apr. 12,
2017), available at: http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/immigration-case-backlog-by-thenumbers/index.html. (“542,411: This is the number of pending cases in immigration court as of
February. The country's 58 immigration courts are already dealing with a crush of more than a half a
million backlogged cases....”); see also Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Immigration Judges Will Always be
Overworked. Now They Will Be Untrained, Too, Washington Post (July 11, 2017), available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/immigration-judges-were-always-overworked-now-theyllbe-untrained-too/2017/07/11/e71bb1fa-4c93-11e7-a18660c031eab644_story.html?utm_term=.458a3476d09b (“On average, an immigration judge completes
more than 1,500 cases per year, with a ratio of 1 law clerk for every 4 judges.”).
267. See id.
268. See Kopan, supra note 260; Jonathan Blitzer, What Will Trump Do with Half a Million
Backlogged Immigration Cases?, NEW YORKER (June 20, 2017).
269. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). When considering whether a new procedure is necessary under the
Due Process clause, Courts must consider:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
270. The Court in Gerstein arguably engaged in an implicit cost analysis because the Court
determined that the formal procedures of a trial were not required to meet the Constitution’s demand for
a neutral magistrate to find probable cause to continue detention. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121-23. In
Riverside, the Court allowed for a “reasonable postponement” (of no more than forty-eight hours)
“while the police cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly burdened
criminal justice system.” Riverside, 500 U.S. at 55. The Court thus overruled the Ninth Circuit, which
interpreted Gerstein’s prompt probable cause requirement to mandate that the hearing be held as soon as
the administrative steps incident to arrest were completed. Id. at 54.
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were awarding damages for the unlawful detention against government
actors.271 Because this article proposes that courts find a Fourth, not
Fifth, Amendment violation in the use of expedited and administrative
removal procedures, cost should not be factored into the calculus. Also,
as Stephen Legomsky has noted in his article proposing a conversion of
immigration judges into administrative law judges, “[p]erhaps most
important, ‘efficient” does not mean “cheap.’”272 He writes, “[t]he ideal
adjudication system would churn out a high number of accurate
decisions at a low cost. In algebraic terms, adjudicatory efficiency might
therefore be thought of as productivity times accuracy, divided by
cost.”273
Would requiring immigration judges to review the detention for
probable cause be no more than a “rubber stamp” on the ICE officer’s
decision?274 Such a solution could suffer similar critiques as stipulated
orders of removal, which require an immigration judge to sign off on a
noncitizen’s waiver of his right to a hearing.275 Scholars and courts
alike have critiqued the problematic aspects of the stipulated removal
order – that a non-lawyer, low-level immigration officer advises
noncitizens about the law, noncitizens frequently waive the right to
counsel, and the judge never independently verifies whether the waiver
of hearing was truly “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”276 To avoid
such pitfalls, a probable cause hearing would have to involve a detainee
personally appearing before a judge, who would review the evidence to
determine whether DHS could justify detention.
The risk of an immigration judge “rubber stamping” a DHS officer’s
decision also finds support in the criminal justice context, where
magistrate judges’ speedy review of warrant applications has led to
rubber stamping, a practice that scholars have exposed and critiqued.277
271. See supra Part IId.
272. Legomsky, supra note 261, at 1647.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 1029 (citing Edwin Harwood, Arrests Without Warrants:
The Legal and Organizational Environment of Immigration Law Enforcement, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
505, 531 (1984)) (discussing study of immigration enforcement that found the ease with which border
patrol agents could come up with reasonable suspicion, a practice referred to as “canned p.c.” [probable
cause]).
275. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (allowing for removal orders that are stipulated to by the noncitizen
or his representative); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (detailing contents of a stipulated removal order, which, if
the noncitizen is unrepresented, requires an immigration judge to determine that the waiver of the
hearing is “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent”); see generally Koh, supra note 20, at 497.
276. See id. Following a 2010 Ninth Circuit decision critiquing several aspects of the stipulated
removal order program as violating detainees’ due process rights, DHS appears to have decreased its use
of the stipulated removal order program. See Koh, supra note 4, at 217 (citing United States v. Ramos,
623 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2010)).
277. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1609, 1613-14 (2012) (“There are perennial concerns that magistrates are ‘rubber stamps,’ granting
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That the criminal justice system’s response to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement has been weak does not undermine the importance
of such a requirement. The Court’s language in Gerstein and Riverside
of a “neutral, detached magistrate” should mean something.278 Perhaps
the immigration system could learn from the mistakes made in the
criminal justice system in setting forth its own probable cause hearing
requirements.
B. Habeas Corpus as a Remedy
The last remaining question is what remedy should apply in light of
the Fourth Amendment violations outlined here.279 The remedy that I
propose is immediate release if an immigration judge does not find
probable cause to detain within forty-eight hours of arrest. This would
take the form of a habeas corpus petition, since the noncitizen would be
challenging unlawful detention, in violation of the Fourth Amendment
right to a probable cause finding by a neutral judge.280 Habeas
petitioners also could seek declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting
that the court order a probable cause hearing by an immigration judge
before someone can be detained pursuant to the expedited or
administrative removal procedures.281 A full discussion of the statutory
bars to declaratory and injunctive relief is beyond the scope of this
article, however.282
warrants without serious scrutiny.”); Paul Sutton, The Fourth Amendment in Action: An Empirical
Review of the Search Warrant Process, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 405, 421 (1986); Richard Van Duizend, et
al., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES (1985) (describing
results of study of warrant practices in in multiple jurisdictions).
278. See David E. Steinberg, Zealous Officers and Neutral Magistrates: The Rhetoric of the
Fourth Amendment, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2010) (arguing that “the Court’s distinction
between ‘neutral’ magistrates and ‘zealous’ police officers is seriously misleading”).
279. See Heffernan, supra note 216, at 804 (“Remedies vindicate rights. They can offer ex ante
protection of rights; they can also offer ex post relief for rights violations.”).
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Arias, 676 F.2d at 1144 (reasoning that habeas corpus is available if
deportation proceedings are not “begun with reasonable promptness after the alien’s arrest”); see also
Indefinite Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on Ins Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. S 287.3, 26
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 427 (2001) (discussing how persons detained pursuant to new
interim rule allowing DHS to delay issuance of Notice to Appear in exigent circumstances can pursue a
habeas corpus petition to challenge their detention).
281. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106-07, n5, n6 (class of plaintiffs who complained that their Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when they were not promptly brought before a neutral judge demanded
not release, but declaratory and injunctive relief, asking that the court to order that a probable cause
hearing be held); see also Riverside, 500 U.S. at 48-49 (pursuing both declaratory and injunctive relief,
seeking court to order that all persons arrested without a warrant be afforded a judicial determination of
probable cause within thirty-six hours of arrest).
282. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (“No court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction
or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221—1231], other than
with respect to . . . an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”);
Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010) (considering declaratory and injunctive relief

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/2

40

Holper: The Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations

2018]

UNREASONABLE SEIZURES OF SHADOW DEPORTATIONS

963

Habeas corpus is in many ways an ideal remedy because it offers the
victim of the Fourth Amendment violation what he lost: physical
freedom.283 It is specifically reparative, giving back what was taken
away; in this sense, it is very different from a remedy such as monetary
damages, which serve as a substitute for specific reparation.284 Money
damages also may be difficult to obtain for noncitizens in administrative
and expedited removal, given that the noncitizen would have to sue ICE
using a Bivens action (as opposed to the detainer litigation, where
noncitizens could sue state officials using 42 U.S.C. § 1983).285 Court
have found that the Bivens remedy is inappropriate in the context of
regular removal proceedings because of the availability of other relief;286
additionally, the Supreme Court recently has cautioned courts against
extending the Bivens remedy to new situations.287
for class of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) whose detention had
exceeded six months and stating that “the text . . . most clearly shows that Section 1252(f) was not
meant to bar classwide declaratory relief.”); id. at 1119, 1126 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A))
(Comparing the text of 1252(f)(1) to the statutory preclusion on courts entering “declaratory, injunctive,
or equitable relief” in the context of expedited removal and writing that “Congress knew how to say
‘declaratory relief’ in enacting the IIRIRA, but it chose not to use it in Section 1252(f).”); see also Reno
v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999) (“By its plain terms, and even by its title, that provision [§
1252(f)] is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief. It prohibits federal courts from
granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation of §§ 1221-1231, but specifies that this ban
does not extend to individual cases.”); RILR v. Johnson, 80 F.Supp.3d 164, 184 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing
Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1120) (“Section 1252(f)(1) ‘prohibits only injunction of ‘the operation of’ the
detention statutes, not injunction of a violation of the statutes . . . [p]ut another way, ‘[w]here . . . a
petitioner seeks to enjoin conduct that allegedly is not even authorized by the statute, the court is not
enjoining the operation of [the statute], and § 1252(f)(1) therefore is not implicated.’”).
283. See Heffernan, supra note 216, at 806.
284. Id. at 806.
285. See ACLU, supra note 7, at 6-9.
286. See, e.g., De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, (U.S. June 26, 2017)
(holding that when noncitizens filed a Bivens claim against border patrol agents for violating their
Fourth Amendment rights by arresting them based solely on their race, they could not pursue a Bivens
claim because deportation proceedings could adequately address the wrongs); Mirmehdi v. U.S., 689
F.3d 975, 979–83 (9th Cir. 2012) (in case of Iranian nationals suing FBI and INS for unlawful
immigration detention, holding that a Bivens remedy was not available because the petitioners had
availed themselves to two different remedial procedures – habeas corpus and deportation proceedings –
and thus Bivens was inappropriate); but see Mendia v. Garcia, 165 F.Supp.3d 861, 882-85 (N.D.Ca.
2016) (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 550 (2007)) (applying Wilkie test for whether to extend
Bivens to a new context – when ICE put a detainer hold on someone who was a U.S. citizens – and
deciding that the INA did not provide an adequate procedural remedy, so Bivens remedy was
appropriate, and that because the person was no longer in custody, habeas was not an appropriate
remedy); Lyttle v. United States, 867 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1277-1278 (M.D.Ga.2012) (finding the INA did
not preclude a Bivens remedy because although the INA provided some procedural protections for U.S.
citizens mistaken for noncitizens, those procedures were not constitutionally adequate). It would be an
open question whether the fairly paltry procedures available through expedited and administrative
removal, in addition to the habeas bars for expedited removal, would suffice to provide a substitute
remedy. See supra Part IIb, c; infra notes 293-309 (discussing jurisdictional bars to habeas claims in
expedited removal).
287. In Ziglar v. Abbasi the Court in 2017 dismissed a Bivens claims against the FBI Director,
Former Attorney General John Ashcroft, and former INS Commissioner James Ziglar, for harsh
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The application of the exclusionary rule may not provide the specific
reparation that a noncitizen seeks, although another possible remedy.
Scholars have debated whether the exclusionary rule is specifically
reparative, since an officer’s violation of the defendant’s right to privacy
can never be restored; thus, the exclusionary rule benefits the greater
society by deterring that future misconduct by the arresting officer.288
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does
not apply in the context of regular removal proceedings except in certain
circumstances.289
Even if one of Lopez-Mendoza’s exceptions
applied,290 there would simply be no forum in which to raise the
arguments because a noncitizen in expedited or administrative removal
never sees an immigration judge. Thus, I propose a habeas petition as a
remedy to the Fourth Amendment violations occurring within expedited
and administrative removal that I have described.
For those detained pursuant to administrative removal, the statute
contemplates judicial review in the same manner as with regular
removal proceedings.291
In removal proceedings, however, the
detention conditions in the days immediately following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. See
No. 15-1358 (June 19, 2017). The Court determined that prisoner abuse was a new expansion of Bivens
that could only be remedied by Congress, not the Court. See slip op. at 11-14, 22. The Court did not
reach the issue of whether immigration law provided an adequate remedy for the noncitizen plaintiffs.
See id.
288. See Heffernan, supra note 216, at 807-08; but see Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule
Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 285, 292 (1998) (arguing
that restoration of rights lost in the illegal search or seizure may be viewed as the central aim and benefit
of the exclusionary rule, since it restores each party to the status quo ante, yet acknowledging that
exclusion “will rarely completely restore the parties to the position they would have been in had the
Fourth Amendment been honored”); William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Compensatory Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 655-656
(1983).
289. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51.
290. One could say that an exception to Lopez-Mendoza’s holding applies to expedited removal,
because the Fourth Amendment violations are widespread. See supra note 229 (number of persons
subject to administrative and expedited removal). Alternatively, the expedited and administrative
removal procedures transgress notions of fundamental fairness, since the requirement of separation of
functions – that the same person should not be prosecutor and judge – finds its roots in the Due Process
concept of procedural fairness. See Flores, 942 F.2d at 1368 (Tang, J., concurring) (“Our Constitution
has long recognized that combining the roles of prosecutor and adjudicator in a single entity is a recipe
for fundamentally unfair and erroneous decisionmaking.”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the
War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 396 (2006) (outlining theories for decisional
independence and stating, “[p]robably the most obvious, and certainly one of the most frequently
asserted, theories of decisional independence is procedural fairness”). These two exceptions present
alternative arguments for applying the exclusionary rule. See Yanez-Marquez, 789 F.3d 434, at 449
(citing Lopez-Mendoza, 486 U.S. at 1050) (finding that while the Lopez-Mendoza Court stated that one
of the exceptions to its ruling is if the Fourth Amendment violation “transgress[es] notions of
fundamental fairness and undermine[s] the probative evidence obtained,” on “closer inspection of the
context of this statement reveals that the Supreme Court meant to use the disjunctive ‘or’ instead of the
conjunctive ‘and’ to create two avenues of relief instead of one such avenue”).
291. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4)(E) (“The Attorney General shall provide that . . . a record is
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proscribed path to judicial review of a removal order is separate from a
challenge to detention.292 A challenge to the legality of detention within
the context of administrative removal is through habeas corpus.293
A habeas challenge to expedited removal is up against the statutory
preclusion of judicial review that Congress established in 1996 when it
created expedited removal.294 The ability to systemically challenge the
expedited removal procedures, for which Congress gave a sixty-day
window after its implementation,295 already was unsuccessful in the
D.C. Circuit in the case of AILA v. Reno296 in 2000. Because of the
short window to raise such claims, only two people had standing; since
they were not permanent residents or persons with substantial
connections to the U.S., the court decided they had no due process rights
to raise any of the challenges.297
maintained for judicial review.”); see also Koh, supra note 4, at 211; Gerald Neuman, The Habeas
Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 572 (2010).
292. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (“[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals
in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of
removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e).”);
see id. at (e) (limitations on judicial review of expedited removal orders).
293. See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d
1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003)). Specifically, federal district
courts have jurisdiction to address “questions of law in habeas corpus proceedings brought by aliens
challenging Executive interpretations of the immigration laws.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306–07
(2001); See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
294. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section
2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such
title, no court shall have jurisdiction to review (i) except as provided in subsection (e), any
individual determination or to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or relating to
the implementation or operation of an [expedited removal order]; (ii) except as provided in
subsection (e), a decision by the Attorney General to invoke the [expedited removal
procedures]; (iii) the application of [expedited removal] to individual aliens, including the
determination made under section 1225(b)(1)(B) of this title, or; (iv) except as provided in
subsection (e), procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney General to implement the
[expedited removal] provisions.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A).
Judicial review of an expedited removal order is available in habeas corpus proceedings, but is
limited to determinations of--(A) whether the petitioner is an alien; (B) whether the petitioner
was ordered removed under such section, and (C) whether the petitioner can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, has been admitted as a refugee..., or has been granted asylum…, such status not
having been terminated, and is entitled to such further inquiry as prescribed by the Attorney
General pursuant to section 1225(b)(1)(C) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).
295. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A) (providing jurisdiction to the district court for the District of
Columbia to review challenges to the validity of the expedited removal system, including constitutional
challenges or other challenges that the procedures are invalid, which must be brought within sixty days
after the implementation of the challenged statute or regulation).
296. 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
297. AILA v. Reno, 18 F.Supp.2d 38, 60 (D.D.C. 1998). With respect to the organizational
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More recently, in Castro v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,298
the Third Circuit in 2016 considered the case of a class of asylumseekers who were subjected to expedited removal after negative credible
fear determinations by both an asylum officer and immigration judge.299
Deciding whether the statute precluding judicial review of expedited
removal orders violated the Suspension Clause,300 the court held that
because the noncitizens were apprehended within hours of their illegal
entry into the United States, they were treated as seeking admission;
thus they could not invoke any constitutional rights, including rights
under the Suspension Clause.301 Under the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Knauff and Mezei, “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress,
it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”302 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Castro case.303
A year later, In Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen. of the United States,
the Third Circuit in 2018 reasoned that petitioners, who had entered the
U.S. unlawfully, satisfied the eligibility criteria for special immigrant
juvenile status, but were awaiting availability of visas, developed the
“substantial connections with this country,” such that precluding their
challenge to expedited removal via habeas corpus violated the
Suspension Clause.304 The court reasoned, “This is not to suggest that
aliens must be accorded a formal statutory designation and attendant
benefits to lay claim to ‘substantial connections’ to invoke the
Suspension Clause . . . We need not address here what minimum
requirements aliens must meet to lay claim to constitutional
protections.”305
In 2018, the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez306 also opined
on this statute that supposedly precluded all habeas challenges to those
in expedited removal.307 Here two justices (although not a majority)
plaintiffs, their only claim that survived a standing challenge was their First Amendment claim, which
was rejected. Id. at 52, 61-62. The D.C. Circuit decided that the organizational plaintiffs did not have
standing to raise claims, whether statutory or constitutional, on behalf of noncitizens subject to the
expedited removal procedures. See AILA, 199 F.3d at 1364.
298. 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016).
299. Id. at 427-28.
300. U.S. CONST, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
301. Castro, 835 F.3d at 445-46.
302. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
303. Castro v. DHS, 137 S.Ct. 1581 (2017).
304. 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 16265, *23 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at
271).
305. Id. at 28 n.13.
306. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
307. Id. at 839-40.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/2

44

Holper: The Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations

2018]

UNREASONABLE SEIZURES OF SHADOW DEPORTATIONS

967

opined that this statute could not be read to make prolonged detention
claims “effectively unreviewable.”308 Although the Jennings Court did
not consider the Suspension Clause question, at least some justices
sought to limit what could be a permissible, but constitutionally
problematic, reading of the statute barring habeas review of expedited
removal claims.309
The Castro decision, although problematic,310 does not foreclose
future habeas relief and Suspension Clause arguments for the wide
variety of noncitizens subject to expedited removal who have been in
the U.S. for longer than those few hours the Castro petitioners were in
the U.S. – especially when, as is planned, expedited removal applies to
those who are in the U.S. for up to two years.311 Using the level of
membership, including ties to the U.S. community and length of
residence in the U.S., as a gauge for how much process is due (as the
Third Circuit in Castro and immigration scholars have
recommended),312 more noncitizens subject to these procedures will
308. Id. at 840.
309. See id. at 839-41.
310. See Petition for Certiorari, Castro v. DHS, 2016 WL 7451290 (U.S.), 1-2 (Dec. 22, 2016)
(quoting U.S. CONST, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 and Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693) (arguing that the Castro court
violated the Suspension Clause because the writ of habeas corpus may not be denied to individuals
within the U.S. except in “ “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion,” and that noncitizens are entitled to
constitutional rights after they enter the country, regardless of whether their presence is “temporary” or
“unlawful”). Many critics believe that no person should be beyond the reach of the Constitution. See,
e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1393-94 (1953) (stating that “the Constitution always
applies when a court is sitting with jurisdiction in habeas corpus” but that “the requirements of due
process must vary with the circumstances”); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary
Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 374 (2002)
(characterizing as “wildly out of step with modern constitutional law” the Mezei Court’s affirmance of
Knauff’s holding that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned”). David Cole has argued that the Court’s decision in Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, which is the foundational case for the entry fiction, “does not stand for the sweeping
proposition that aliens beyond our borders have no rights, or even no due process rights, but establishes
only the narrower claim that because non-citizens have no liberty or property interest in entry they have
no right to object to the procedures used to exclude them.” See Cole, supra note 8, at 1031-33. He
writes that the Mezei Court, “[v]irtually without analysis . . . extended the right-privilege distinction that
governed in Knauff to the distinct issue of indefinite detention.” Id. at 1033; see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-92, 696, 699 (2001) (interpreting statute to avoid Due Process concerns for a
detainee under a final order of removal and stating that the individual released from detention does not
gain a right to reside in the U.S., but merely the right to be free of restraint on his liberty).
311. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 5-6.
312. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 446-48. David Martin has argued that what process is due, or
“owed” to a noncitizen rightly depends not on the arbitrary line between whether the noncitizen is in
exclusion or deportation proceedings, but that the noncitizen’s level of membership should govern how
much process is due. David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 192, 214–15 (1983); see also Johnson, An
Immigration Gideon, supra note 212, at 2404-12 (arguing that lawful permanent residents, because their
Due Process rights are the strongest, should get court-appointed counsel in removal proceedings); but
see Núñez, supra note 151, at 122-23 (discussing failures of status-based membership theory because
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have stronger ties to the U.S. because they will have been here longer—
up to two years—and yet still be in expedited removal. Using the Third
Circuit’s analysis in both Castro and Osorio-Martinez, they will have
created a stake hold in the United States via their presence, connections
to the U.S. community, and eligibility for immigration relief, which in
turn allows future courts to entertain whether stripping them of habeas
corpus rights violates the Suspension Clause.313 They will be far beyond
the “very recent surreptitious entry,” which allowed the Castro court to
assimilate their status to those of “aliens seeking initial admission to the
country” and thus outside of the Constitution’s protections.314 Gerald
Neuman, who has critiqued the jurisdiction-stripping functions of
expedited removal, has written that the statute closing the window for
systemic challenges to expedited removal likely violates the Suspension
Clause, especially if expedited removal expands beyond those at the
border.315 Even one of expedited removal’s defenders, David Martin,
wrote in 2000 (when expedited removal was only applied to those
seeking admission at the border), “If [expedited removal] is applied
beyond today’s scope, as the statute allows, to entrants without
inspection who have been present for less than two years, then we can
expect a significant court test of the full reach of the Knauff/Mezei
doctrine – or, conceivably, an occasion to rethink it more
comprehensively.”316
this approach values the state’s consent above all else); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process
and “Community Ties:” A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 244–45 (1983) (arguing that
due process should turn not on the person’s membership in the United States community—the United
States’ relationship to her—but rather on her community ties—what the United States is taking from
her).
313. See Castro, 835 F.3d at 446-48. For a discussion of why the statute stripping those in
expedited removal proceedings of their habeas rights violates the Suspension Clause, see Neuman,
Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, supra note 290, at 571-77 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct.
2229 (2008) (arguing that after the Court’s Boumediene v. Bush decision, statutory preclusion on habeas
review of expedited removal violates the Suspension Clause).
314. See Osorio-Martinez, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 16265, at *23; Castro, 835 F.3d at 449.
315. Gerald Neuman, Federal Court Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1676-79
(2000) (arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)’s confining all constitutional challenges to a long-closed
statutory window is unconstitutional with regard to subsequent victims); id. at 1678 (describing “[t]his
largely illusory scheme of judicial review” as one that “might be reconciled with the Constitution to the
extent that it would be applied to individuals who had no constitutional right to judicial inquiry into the
lawfulness of the procedures applied against them, assuming arguendo that such individuals exist.”).
316. David Martin, supra note 43, at 689. Martin discusses how the Supreme Court has never
squarely ruled on the procedural due process claims for those who entered the U.S. without inspection
(known as “EWIs”). He notes, however, that there is a “certain anomaly . . . in giving greater rights to
persons who completely evaded border screening, while those who presented themselves for inspection
as the law required were rewarded with constitutional limbo.” Id. at 689-90. Yet, he believes that the
ties EWIs create while in the U.S., even though illicitly obtained and thus “discounted somewhat in the
due process calculus,” are not weightless, “and it would be unfortunate if the Court were to act as
though EWIs have no greater interests than first-time applicants for admission at the border.” Id. at 691.
He also notes that expanding expedited removal to those who are in the U.S. up to two years means that
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A limitation on habeas as a remedy is that a successful habeas
petition usually requires a lawyer. In expedited and administrative
removal, there is no court-appointed counsel.317 Even if the detainee
obtains counsel, deportation defense attorneys are not always versed in
the intricacies of Fourth Amendment law or habeas corpus petitions.
Statutory limitations on class-wide relief make it difficult for claims to
be consolidated for the purposes of litigation with skilled counsel.318
That, however, is a problem with another remedy – better funding for
deportation defense attorneys to handle individual cases and adequate
training in habeas corpus litigation.319 And should Kevin Johnson’s call
for “truly rebellious lawyering” be answered by immigration defense
attorneys,320 immigration law’s next Fourth Amendment problem may
come into focus.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held over forty years ago that “[T]he Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”321
Gerstein’s promise has not extended to arrests by immigration officers
for deportation, and now the current political climate finds us in a place
where DHS officers—acting as the “prosecutor, judge, and jailor”322—
will increasingly make more decisions to detain for deportation with
absolutely no review from any independent judge. The Court in
Gerstein cautioned against such prosecutorial judgment “stand[ing]

many others will get “caught up in the sweep, and have insufficient opportunity to show that they have
developed more extensive ties to the United States.” Id. at 700. As compared to when expedited
removal is only applied at the border, or to those caught in the act of clandestine entry, “the physical
facts make it highly likely that the procedure covers persons whose stakes are traditionally judged to be
low – persons applying for a new benefit rather than persons who might suffer the deprivation of certain
liberties or true entitlements they have previously enjoyed.” Id. at 700.
317. See supra Part IIb, c.
318. See Chacón, supra note 175, at 1631.
319. The funding for a public defender system for detainees has materialized in cities like New
York and San Francisco, and is being considered in other cities such as Boston. See, e.g., San Francisco
Public Defender, SF Public Defender Immigration Unit Launches Today (May 23, 2017), available at:
http://sfpublicdefender.org/news/2017/05/sf-public-defender-immigration-unit-launches-today/;
Tito
Jackson Pitches Fund for Immigrants, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 8, 2017). Also, the New England Chapter
of the American Immigration Lawyers Association recently created a Federal Litigation Project Fund to
support immigration lawyers who wish to engage in impact litigation in federal court; this fund also
provides for a seasoned federal court litigator to act as a mentor for such attorneys. The author is a
trustee of this Fund.
320. See generally Johnson, supra note 8, at 1044.
321. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
322. See ACLU, supra note 115, at 2.
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alone” to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.323
With the rise of procedures such as expedited and administrative
removal, and the use of such procedures to detain more people, there is
an even greater need for the decision of a detached judge to determine
probable cause to arrest.
The judiciary arguably has become
emboldened in the Trump presidency, causing judges to question
whether immigration law should be exempt from constitutional
challenges.324 If courts take a closer look at administrative and
expedited removals, they will begin to see the Fourth Amendment
violations that lurk in the shadows of immigration law.

323. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117.
324. See International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017);
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
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